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“For by Art is created that great Leviathan called 
a Commonwealth or State, which is but an artifi-
cial Man; though of greater stature and strength 
than the Natural, for whose protection and defence 
it was intended … [without the State] there is con-
tinual fear, and the danger of violent death; and life 
of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
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No one is in control� It is very fright-ening� Power is in the streets, and it belongs to those with a gun,” 
said a businessman to a journalist from the 
Associated Press in 1997� In his country, 
an ongoing civil war had spurred trav-
el bans from the capital, leading many to 
book plane tickets under false names, and a 
sense of dread had fallen over the city� An-
other citizen echoed his sentiments, telling 
another journalist how the gunmen had 
killed his brother: “My mother Florence 
heard the shots from the house, and she 
always remembered how she saw two men 
running away cheering” (O’Boyle, 2017)� 
He went on to describe how the targeting 
of his brother in the civil war later de-
stroyed their mother, remarking, “There’s 
no doubt in my mind it was brought on the 
stress of what happened�”
Despite the similarity of their situa-
tions, these two citizens were describing 
lawlessness and violence in two separate 
civil wars on two different continents� The 
businessman, Robert Mulamba, spoke to 
reporters in what was then known as Zaire, 
known today as the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo� As Mulamba grimly awaited 
gunmen in the anarchic streets of Kinsha-
sa, the civil war in which Ken Funston’s 
brother was gunned down was drawing to 
a close after decades of violence� Funston 
lived in County Fermanagh in Northern 
Ireland, which since 1969 had been rocked 
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Leviathan
Lost
While wars between nations have declined 
over the past twenty years, intrastate con-
flicts are on the rise�, leading scholars to 
examine the conditions under which civil 
war is likely to break out, to last longer, 
and to intensify� The strength of the local 
government has emerged as a critical factor 
that could potentially mitigate the harms 
posed by civil wars� This thesis addresses 
two research questions: what is the impact of 
state strength on (1) conflict duration and (2) 
conflict intensity? To answer these research 
questions, I conduct several quantitative anal-
yses of all internal conflicts occurring in the 
years 1960-2015, examining the relationship 
between state strength and conflict duration 
and battle deaths per year� This thesis ulti-
mately finds that state strength, as proxied by 
military, fiscal, and bureaucratic capacities, is 
negatively correlated with conflict intensity 
but is positively correlated with conflict du-
ration� This thesis concludes with the presen-
tation of two case studies – the First Congo 
War and the Troubles of Northern Ireland 
– to illustrate how strong states may experi-
ence longer, but less bloody, civil wars�
Abstract
“For by Art is created that great Leviathan called 
a Commonwealth or State, which is but an artifi-
cial Man; though of greater stature and strength 
than the Natural, for whose protection and defence 
it was intended … [without the State] there is con-
tinual fear, and the danger of violent death; and life 
of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”
– Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651)
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4diers and civilians alike, and those that 
do not die directly from violence are often 
harmed by the subsequent failure of insti-
tutions, threats to public health, and col-
lapse of the local economy (Imai & Wein-
stein, 2000)� Moreover, civil wars are on 
the rise: a third of all nations since 1960 
have experienced internal conflict of some 
sort, and intrastate wars have occurred far 
more frequently than have interstate wars 
over the past seventy years (Blattman & 
Miguel, 2010; Dosse, 2010)�
In recent years, the civil war literature 
has turned away from analyzing the de-
sire to engage in civil war (namely a focus 
on economic greed or political grievance) 
towards an opportunity-based model of 
civil war outbreak� This model focuses 
on the political opportunity structure in 
place that informs potential rebels’ deci-
sion to wage civil war, and at its center is 
a discussion of state capacity (Tilly, 1978)� 
Scholars are now examining the condi-
tions under which civil war is likely to 
break out, to last longer, and to intensify, 
and the strength of the local government 
has emerged as a critical factor that could 
potentially mitigate the harms posed by 
civil wars� Underlying this scholarship is 
the hope that states can protect their citi-
zens from violence within their own bor-
ders, and the ability of the state to amelio-
rate the natural conditions of anarchy has 
been a centerpiece of political theory from 
the 1600s onwards� While much atten-
tion has been paid to the ability of states 
to forestall civil war onset, more research 
is needed regarding how state strength 
and legitimacy can change the character 
and dynamics of civil wars once they oc-
cur� This thesis hopes to fill this gap in 
the literature by addressing the two fol-
lowing research questions: why are some 
civil wars more intense than others, and 
why do some civil wars last longer than 
by sectarian violence in which over 3,000 
people, Funston’s brother among them, 
would ultimately die� Despite their dra-
matically different life circumstances, both 
Mulamba and Funston found themselves 
subjected to and terrorized by capricious 
and random violence� Despite their dra-
matically different countries, both Mulam-
ba and Funston regarded the rebels with a 
mixture of hostility and fear� And despite 
the dramatically different levels of polit-
ical development in their countries, both 
Mulamba and Funston found themselves 
in the middle of a conflict spurred by mas-
sive grievances against the state� Griev-
ances against governments are pervasive 
and eternal� But what makes Mulamba and 
Funston’s circumstances unique is these 
grievances boiled over in the form of civil 
war�
As Mulamba’s and Funston’s stories 
should illustrate, civil wars demonstrate 
remarkable variation in their outbreak, 
violence, combatants, length, and inten-
sity� The shortest civil wars end within 
minutes after the staging of a bloody coup 
d’état, while some internal conflicts last 
decades – the Sudanese Civil War began 
in August 1955 and is still being fought 
to this day, sixty-one years later� Mean-
while, some civil wars have seen the death 
of millions, while some civil wars kill two 
dozen people per year and are punctuat-
ed by long lulls in the violence� Some civil 
wars are fought between two clearly-de-
fined armies in pitched battles with clear 
frontlines, while other civil wars entail 
years of guerilla warfare between a strong 
state and a rebel group barely clinging to 
survival� But Mulamba’s and Funston’s 
stories also show that, regardless of their 
intensity or length, one thing is certain 
about civil wars, and that is the tremen-
dous toll they take on local populations 
and economies� Civil wars victimize sol-
5the existing literature regarding state 
strength, intensity of conflict, and length 
of conflict, using the existing scholar-
ship to later inform my decisions of how 
to operationalize state capacity� Following 
this, I advance a theory of how three ma-
jor components of state capacity (military 
strength, government revenues, and bu-
reaucratic quality) inf luence duration and 
intensity of conflict� After this, I outline 
my data and methodology for my quantita-
tive and qualitative analyses� I then present 
the findings of my quantitative analyses 
of all internal conflicts occurring in the 
years 1960 – 2015� This thesis finds that 
state strength is positively correlated with 
duration of civil war; that is, the stronger 
a state, the longer civil war within its bor-
ders is likely to endure� In addition, this 
thesis finds that state capacity is statisti-
cally significantly and negatively correlat-
ed with battle deaths occurring in a civil 
war, meaning that stronger states tend to 
experience lower-intensity conflicts� To il-
lustrate the potential mechanisms leading 
to these relationships, I then provide the 
two case studies of the First Congo War 
and the Troubles of Northern Ireland� The 
final section concludes with implications 
of the findings and questions for further 
research�
Literature Review
Intrastate wars have occurred far more frequently in recent years than in-ter-state wars and tend to endure lon-
ger, and their effects range from extreme 
loss of human life to economic damage 
(Fearon, 2004; Themnér & Wallensteen, 
2013)� Because of the massive harms posed 
by civil wars, scholars have sought to iden-
tify specific ways in which the effects of 
civil wars persist and impact the popula-
tion� To begin with, civil wars kill both 
others? These questions have importance 
because they examine the qualities and 
characteristics of civil wars under various 
conditions of state strength, leading to a 
greater understanding of the opportuni-
ty structures rebels face when fighting 
against a government� These questions 
also have significance for peacekeepers in 
generating policy prescriptions for pre-
dicting, forestalling, and resolving intra-
state conflict� 
This thesis will advance hypotheses re-
garding the extent to which state capacity 
impacts the intensity and length of civil 
war and ultimately argues that military, 
fiscal, and bureaucratic capacity are essen-
tial components of state capacity� Using 
these proxies for state capacity, I will show 
that state strength is negatively correlated 
with conflict intensity but positively asso-
ciated with civil war intensity� In addition 
to my statistical analyses, this thesis pro-
vides two case studies to illustrate how 
state capacity may lengthen civil wars 
but attenuate their intensity: first, Robert 
Mulamba’s war of First Congo War, and 
second, Ken Funston’s war of the Troubles 
in Northern Ireland� In the First Congo 
War, the dissolution of the Zairian state, 
coupled with fallout from the Rwandan 
genocide, allowed rebels to quickly un-
seat the Mobutu regime, with thousands 
of battle deaths and tens of thousands of 
civilian deaths occurring in only a few 
months of conflict� On the other hand, in 
the Troubles in Northern Ireland, one of 
the strongest states in the world underes-
timated the severity of grievances held by 
citizens of one of its peripheral provinces 
and struggled to strike an appropriate bal-
ance between the use of military and polit-
ical strategies, leading to a low-intensity 
conflict of nearly thirty years�
In the following section, I outline 
6as coercion, co-optation, and cooperation 
with potential internal adversaries� States 
can help keep the civil peace and stop civil 
war outbreak through high levels of gov-
ernment spending on political goods and 
the establishment of trustworthy institu-
tions (Fjelde & De Soysa, 2009)� But when 
states cannot keep control and descend 
into civil war, Collier, Hoeff ler, and Soder-
bom (2004) note that a state’s lack of eco-
nomic and military capacity can lengthen 
the duration of a civil war� Moreover, esca-
lation of civil war can lead to an increase 
in military spending in the warring coun-
try itself and in neighboring countries, re-
quiring more demands on state fiscal ca-
pacity (Phillips, 2015)� On the other hand, 
state capacity – as measured by military 
quality and gross domestic product – has 
been shown not to be associated with in-
tensity of civil war conflict (Lacina, 2006)� 
However, it is not immediately clear what 
impact other measures of state capacity 
have on conflict intensity� Much of the lit-
erature focuses on defining state capacity, 
state capacity’s impact on internal devel-
opment, how state capacity can forestall 
civil war onset, and how state capacity can 
aid the resolution of civil wars�
State capacity is a crucial and diffi-
cult concept to define and operationalize� 
Kocher (2010) criticizes the use of the term 
“state capacity,” noting, “You might in-
quire about my capacity to solve equations 
or shoot jump-shots, but it would not make 
much sense to inquire about my capacity 
in general�” Kocher (2010) insists that first 
researchers must identify what type of ca-
pacity states must have and the objectives 
for which that capacity is useful� Some ma-
jor theoretical measures of state capacity 
include military power and capacity, bu-
reaucratic and administrative capacity, fis-
cal capabilities, and quality and coherence 
of political institutions (Hendrix, 2010)� 
on and off the battlefield: nearly as many 
people are indirectly killed by civil wars 
through damaged infrastructure and in-
creased spread of disease as are killed in 
battle (Ghobarah, 2003)� Moreover, civil 
wars destroy national education systems, 
inf licting damage that persists for gen-
erations, and also cause f light of human 
and physical capital (Chamarbagwala & 
Moran, 2011; Collier, 1999; Lai & Thyne, 
2007)� Further, countries take years to 
recover and develop after civil wars, and 
civil war-torn states unsurprisingly expe-
rience reduced international trade (Bay-
er & Rupert, 2004; Flores & Nooruddin, 
2009)� Post-conflict countries tend to re-
ceive less foreign direct investment and 
development aid, and countries that bor-
der post-conflict countries see reduced 
economic growth (Garriga & Phillips, 
2014; Murdoch & Sandler, 2004)� While 
the literature regarding the impacts of 
civil wars is well-developed, not as much 
research has been conducted on factors 
impacting conflict duration and intensity� 
This is a critical area of research because 
when civil wars break out, external coun-
tries and multilateral organizations often 
attempt to reduce the harms posed by the 
war, and loss of life is a primary way that 
intrastate war threatens future stability� 
Thus, the scholarship should attempt to 
address factors that lead to higher losses 
of life, along with longer civil wars� This 
literature review will begin by analyzing 
the existing literature about state capaci-
ty and then turn to an examination of the 
literature regarding conflict duration and 
intensity�
State Capacity
At first blush, states avoid violent chal-
lenges to their authority through multi-
ple methods, including three strategies 
that Fjelde and De Soysa (2009) identify 
7more prone to produce terrorists (Besley 
& Persson, 2010; Rotberg, 2002)� In addi-
tion, state capacity may provide protection 
from regional contagion, as state capacity 
has been shown to decrease the likelihood 
that a state will become infected by civil 
conflict occurring in neighboring territo-
ries (Braithwaite, 2010)�
As a result, a wealth of literature points 
to state capacity as a fundamental factor 
of civil war onset; in conditions of civil 
war, the internal security of the state is 
no longer assured, and the natural securi-
ty dilemma that states exist to prevent is 
exacerbated (Posen, 1993)� Hendrix (2011) 
identifies a negative and significant cor-
relation between civil war onset and fiscal 
capacity as measured by tax revenue, and 
other research notes that controlling for 
measures of state capacity reveals a strong 
negative correlation between democrati-
zation of a country and likelihood of civ-
il conflict (Gleditsch & Ruggeri, 2010)� 
Goodwin and Skocpol (1989) argue that 
democratization, bureaucratic effective-
ness, and size of government army should 
prevent the outbreak of civil war since the 
government is more capable of holding 
the state together� Democratization may 
prevent the outbreak of civil war because 
they produce fewer radicalized elements 
and provide less exclusionary outlets for 
the resolution of ethnic conflict (Gvosdev 
& Gurr, 2000)� Relatedly, an effective bu-
reaucracy is capable of policing rural areas 
and providing services that make citizens 
less inclined to rebel, which may decrease 
the likelihood of civil war onset (Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003)� However, scholars disagree 
on the extent to which strong state ca-
pacity decreases risk of war onset� Sobek 
(2010) argues that strong states have a 
decreased risk of experiencing civil war, 
while Thies (2010) claims that state capac-
ity does not affect civil war onset� How-
Various ways to operationalize military 
capacity abound, namely military person-
nel per capita (Diehl, 1983; Jones, Bremer 
& Singer, 1996; Mason & Fett, 1996; Way-
man, Singer & Goertz, 1983), log military 
spending per capita (Henderson & Singer, 
2000), and log GDP per capita (Fearon & 
Laitin, 2003)� In addition, two major ways 
to operationalize bureaucratic or admin-
istrative capacity include expert assess-
ments of bureaucratic quality and rule of 
law, along with export profiles, natural re-
sources, and extractive capacity (Hendrix, 
2010)� Further, the quality and coherence 
of political institutions is usually identified 
as a critical factor providing state capacity 
(Gurr, 1974; Hegre et al�, 2001)� However, 
Hanson and Sigman (2013) go further and 
identify other measures of state capacity, 
like control of tax evasion, implementation 
of government decisions, and maintaining 
the monopoly on violence as important el-
ements of state capacity� Moreover, various 
theorized dimensions of state capacity can 
be difficult to disentangle from one an-
other, making it tricky for researchers to 
identify which measures of state capacity 
are significant (Hanson & Sigman, 2013; 
Cingolani, 2013)� 
Setting aside questions of how to define 
state capacity, the literature has examined 
the impact of state capacity on general eco-
nomic development and national security� 
Besley and Persson (2010) contend that 
a lack of state capacity, as manifested in 
weak or failed states, is a major obstacle to 
development, and indicators of state weak-
ness all have negative impact on fidelity 
to human rights, leading weak states to 
have worse human rights records on av-
erage than strong ones (Englehart, 2009)� 
Lack of state capacity can lead to securi-
ty concerns as well: a low legal capacity 
can contribute to the likelihood of inter-
nal violence, and failed states are similarly 
8has been well-documented, the impact 
that state capacity can have while civil 
wars are ongoing is not as clear� This is 
a vital question; while state capacity can 
be an important bulwark against civil war 
outbreak, the literature generally fails to 
address what happens when “all else fails” 
and strong states do experience internal 
conflict� Moreover, the literature lacks 
agreement on how to define state capacity 
and how to operationalize it in the context 
of civil wars, and policymakers and peace-
keepers may want answers to the question 
of “what tools or resources may be useful 
to states when fighting a civil war?” Later, 
this thesis will seek to address these gaps 
in the literature by proposing a theory of 
state capacity and how it impacts duration 
and intensity of conflict� 
Conflict Duration
Another major question scholars have 
asked about civil wars centers around the 
determinants of the duration of civil con-
f lict� Grievances and ethnic conflict may 
be linked to length of conflict (Collier, 
Hoeff ler, & Söderbom, 2004)� Collier et 
al� (2004) provide three key conceptualiza-
tions of civil war: rebellion-as-investment 
(in which the critical incentive for fight-
ing is the payoff to rebels once war ends), 
rebellion-as-mistake (in which military 
optimism prevents the recognition of any 
mutually advantageous settlement), and 
rebellion-as-business (in which the rebel-
lion pays off through income or satisfac-
tion while fighting occurs)� Collier et al� 
(2004) find that the key factors that length-
en conflict are low per capita income, 
high inequality, and a moderate degree 
of ethnic division, indicating that rebel-
lion-as-mistake and rebellion-as-business 
are better conceptualizations of civil war 
– that is, “rebellions will occur where and 
only where they are profitable” since the 
ever, both Sobek (2010) and Thies (2010) 
note that civil war onset may reduce state 
capacity, implying a potential reverse cau-
sality� Besley and Persson (2008) back up 
this assertion, finding that the prospect of 
an external war spurs much more invest-
ment and development of fiscal capacity 
than does the prospect of a civil war� 
Finally, state capacity may also be an 
important characteristic that can contrib-
ute to the resolution of civil wars� Capable 
states that experience civil violence might 
be more able to credibly commit to a trea-
ty or negotiation, which increases the like-
lihood the violence can reach a bargained 
conclusion (McBride, Milante, & Skaper-
das, 2011; Sobek, 2010)� Other measures 
of state capacity, like bureaucratic effec-
tiveness and quality of military, may be 
linked to the outcome of civil wars� An 
effective state bureaucracy represents the 
ability of a government to function even 
in times of regime stress, and correspond-
ingly, bureaucratic quality should make it 
more likely the government wins a civil 
war (Goodwin & Skocpol, 1989; Knack, 
2001; Schock, 1996)� Similarly, a strong 
government army may be able to forestall 
losses of territory to rebel groups, making 
it harder for rebels to win (Balch-Lindsay 
& Enterline, 2000)� On the other hand, 
Lacina (2006) finds that quality of mili-
tary is not strongly correlated with sever-
ity of civil war� DeRouen and Sobek (2004) 
also find that size of army alone might not 
necessarily increase the likelihood of vic-
tory, indicating that nonmilitary aspects 
of state capacity are important as well� 
However, DeRouen and Sobek note that, 
while state capacity is necessary for peace 
agreements, it might not be sufficient con-
ditions for a sustainable civil peace� 
Overall, while the impact of state ca-
pacity on civil war onset and resolution 
9Other characteristics of the civil war 
itself – such as its ultimate outcome and 
the goals and structure of its rebels – may 
inf luence its duration� Fearon (2004) finds 
that civil wars emerging from coup d’états 
or revolutions tend to be shorter, as do civil 
wars in Eastern Europe and former Sovi-
et Union states� Cunningham et al� (2009) 
confirm that civil wars resulting from 
coups are shorter on average� In addition, 
governments that face rebels motivated by 
secessionist goals take longer to prevail 
(Brandt, 2008)� The duration of civil wars 
may also be a function of whether it ends 
in government victory, rebel victory, or a 
negotiated settlement, since the baseline 
hazard rates vary from outcome to out-
come (Brandt, 2008)� On the rebels’ side, 
Cunningham (2006) finds that the pres-
ence of multiple rebel organizations in the 
same conflict leads to narrower bargain-
ing ranges, higher risk of info asymme-
tries, last mover advantages, and shifting 
alliances� Therefore, the number of active 
rebel organizations at the start of the con-
f lict should cause wars to endure longer� 
Subsequent research has confirmed this 
“veto players” hypothesis (Cunningham et 
al�, 2009)� 
Not only does the number of rebel 
groups impact the duration of civil war, 
but the strength of those groups may 
also matter� Kalyvas and Balcells (2014) 
propose three types of civil warfare: (1) 
conventional warfare, which consists of 
pitched battles and clear frontlines; (2) ir-
regular warfare, which consists of a con-
ventional state army versus lightly armed 
guerillas; and (3) symmetric nonconven-
tional (SNC) warfare, which consists of 
a government and rebels matched at low 
levels of military sophistication� They find 
that irregular conflicts tend to last longer 
than other conflicts, meaning that the 
relative military capacities of states and 
opportunity costs of civil wars must be 
low in order for them to occur� Ethnic re-
bellions or rebellions motivated by griev-
ance tend to be long in duration, especially 
“sons of the soil” wars that pit a peripher-
al ethnic minority against state-support-
ed migrants of a dominant ethnic group 
(Fearon, 2004)� Wucherpfenning, Met-
termich, Cederman, and Gleditsch (2012) 
find that ethnicity per se does not matter 
as much as how government and nonstate 
leaders capitalize on it, finding that reb-
els’ ethnic linkage to an excluded makes 
conflict endure longer� On the other hand, 
other scholars find that ethnic fractional-
ization makes conflicts shorter (Cunning-
ham, Gleditsch, & Salehyan, 2009)�
Another proposed factor in the dura-
tion of civil wars are the presence of natu-
ral resources in the country experiencing 
conflict� Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala (2009) 
find that fighting in regions with valuable 
minerals – namely, petroleum, gemstones, 
and drugs – lasts substantially longer 
than fighting in regions without those 
natural resources present� Other schol-
ars confirm this finding, possibly since 
it may make rebellion as a business more 
profitable (Fearon, 2004; Wucherpfennig 
et al�, 2012)� On this note, alluvial dia-
monds and illegal drugs may be the most 
strongly linked to duration of civil war, 
since they are considered “lootable” and 
more easily capitalized on by rebels (Ross, 
2003)� Lootable resources like diamonds 
and drugs make non-separatist conflicts 
endure longer but pose little danger in 
separatist conflicts; on the other hand, un-
lootable resources like hydrocarbons tend 
to spur separatist conflicts (Ross, 2003)� 
Other characteristics of a country, in ad-
dition to its abundance of natural resourc-
es, like its democratization and population 
size have been found to lengthen conflict 
(Cunningham et al�, 2009)�
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Kalyvas, 2014; Lu & Thies, 2011; Lujala, 
2009)� Relatedly, scholars have linked eth-
nic dominance and ethnic polarization to 
greater battle deaths in civil wars (Lacina, 
2006; Lu & Thies, 2011)�
Other characteristics of the country ex-
periencing internal conflict may contrib-
ute to the intensity of civil wars� Lujala 
(2009) shows that natural resources, such 
as the presence of gemstones, hydrocar-
bons, and drugs within regions experienc-
ing conflict, increase the number of battle 
deaths� Importantly, Lujala (2009) finds 
that nationwide aggregates of presence of 
natural resources do not retain this predic-
tive power; hydrocarbons and gemstones 
must be present in the areas of fighting 
in order to correlate with battle deaths� 
Other scholars find that whether or not a 
nation is a major oil exporter is a strong 
predictor of how intense its civil war will 
be (Balcells & Kalyvas, 2014)� Another 
geographic factor increasing severity of 
civil war is how rough or mountainous the 
terrain is, which may allow rebels to find 
shelter and regroup (Balcells & Kalyvas, 
2014)� In terms of state activities, Wellen-
dor (2013) shows that education spending 
and male secondary school enrollment 
have a pacifying effect on civil war inten-
sity, while others contend that democrat-
ic institutions can also reduce fatalities 
during civil wars (Lacina, 2006)� Lujala 
(2009) confirms the finding that countries 
that were considered to be democracies a 
year before the conflict started seem to 
experience conflicts with fewer battle-re-
lated deaths� Finally, countries with larger 
populations seem to experience more se-
vere conflicts (Lujala, 2009)� 
In addition, some research shows that 
characteristics of the conflict itself, such 
as the method of warfare or foreign inter-
vention, can affect how intense the conflict 
rebels matter for the duration of civil war� 
Absolute rebel and government strength 
may be a critical factor as well, since rebel 
strength – as measured by a high mobi-
lization, arms-procurement, and fighting 
capacity and a legal political wing – have 
been found to make conflicts shorter 
(Cunningham et al�, 2009)� On the other 
side of the equation, some argue that, at 
minimum, state capacity should increase 
the length of time it takes for insurgents 
to win (Mason, Fett, & Weingarten, 1999)� 
However, the literature on conflict dura-
tion has not fully examined the correlation 
between state capacity and length of civil 
war� When it has addressed this relation-
ship, the measures of state capacity may be 
f lawed� For example, DeRouen and Sobek 
(2004) proxy state capacity with how dem-
ocratic the country is, which does not 
seem to be a fair assessment of a country’s 
strength� Severely authoritarian or repres-
sive regimes may have high state capacity, 
insofar as they can accomplish and achieve 
the objectives they set, while some coun-
tries may be nominally democratic but 
lack solid institutions or bureaucracies� 
Conflict Intensity
The research regarding conflict inten-
sity proposes several variables that might 
lead to higher conflict intensity� Some 
studies show that intensity of conflict is 
significantly correlated with the degree of 
income inequality and wealth inequality, 
indicating that severity of grievance held 
by rebels might lead to more intense wars 
(Murshed & Gates, 2005)� Lu and Thies 
(2011) corroborate this assertion, finding 
that the Gini index of a country is statis-
tically significantly correlated with battle 
deaths in civil wars� Ethnic fractionaliza-
tion, another main grievance cited by the 
literature, has been shown to be correlat-
ed with severity of conflict (Balcells & 
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have been shown to affect civil war inten-
sity, but most of these characteristics of 
nation-states are immutable and not sub-
ject to change over a short period of time� 
State capacity, on the other hand, may be 
manipulable by foreign countries or peace-
keeping organizations through grants or 
provision of arms� If state capacity is asso-
ciated with more or fewer battle deaths in 
a conflict, it may be worth examining for 
policymakers seeking to reduce intensity 
of civil wars� With that in mind, this the-
sis will now advance a definition of state 
capacity and present a theory of how state 
capacity impacts conflict duration and in-
tensity�
Theory
This thesis advances the following definition of state capacity: the ability of a state to set and achieve 
various policy objectives� This definition 
consists of two components: (1) the set-
ting of policy and (2) the implementation 
of policy� The first component requires 
states to be able to coordinate and set pol-
icy goals and objectives; intrinsic in this 
requirement is the necessity that govern-
ments possess a leadership structure that 
can decide the policy objective� Second, 
this definition of state capacity necessi-
tates that governments must be able to 
implement policies to achieve the selected 
objective; in order to do this, states must 
coordinate amongst various bureaucracies 
once the objectives are set and use avail-
able tools and resources to complete the 
objective� I contend that a state possesses 
state capacity when it can accomplish both 
aspects of this definition�
Because there are different objectives at 
different times for different governments, 
state capacity might not always refer to 
the same capabilities; put more specifical-
will become� Kalyvas and Balcells (2014) 
find that conventional wars – those con-
sisting of two armies fighting pitched bat-
tles with clear frontlines – are most like-
ly to have high amounts of battle deaths, 
while SNC wars tend to be less intense� In 
addition, scholars have found a strong cor-
relation between external support for the 
warring parties and intensity of conflict 
(Kalyvas & Balcells, 2014; Lacina, 2006; 
Lujala, 2009)� However, Gleditsch (2007) 
notes that civil wars that attract foreign 
intervention are typically more intense 
to begin with, but other studies control 
for previous conflict intensity levels and 
conclude that various types of interven-
tions can impact civil war intensity, find-
ing that military interventions often lead 
to more intense conflicts (Craig-Morse, 
2013; Sousa, 2014)�  As a result, civil vi-
olence during the Cold War was signifi-
cantly more deadly than thereafter (Laci-
na, 2006; Lujala, 2009)� As put by Lu and 
Thies (2011), “[s]pecifically, the USA and 
USSR through their many interventions 
nearly tripled the number of battle-related 
deaths in a civil conflict during the Cold 
War period” (p� 226)�
Overall, civil war intensity can have 
far-reaching consequences on the region, 
such as increasing numbers of refugees 
and enhancing neighborhood spillover ef-
fects and collateral damage (Murdoch & 
Sandler, 2002; Zolberg, Suhrke, & Aguayo, 
1989), making the study of its correlates 
vitally important� However, while the lit-
erature has indirectly addressed the im-
pact of state capacity through discussion 
of technologies of warfare (namely, Kaly-
vas and Balcells, 2014), scholars have gen-
erally not examined this characteristic 
that is present in all civil wars – the state 
and its capacity to fight a civil war� Some 
qualities of countries, such as oil exporta-
tion, rough terrain, and democratization, 
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determine and set their policy goals – and 
hypothesize what the objectives of states 
might be when engaged in civil war� To 
be sure, various states will set different 
goals, depending on the disposition of the 
top leadership, the history of the country, 
and the strength of the insurgency, but 
this thesis contends that governments are 
concerned with two primary objectives 
during civil war: (1) maintaining the sta-
bility of their regime, and (2) ending the 
civil war� These two objectives are neces-
sary for governments to achieve but may 
not be sufficient in and of themselves; the 
leadership might set other goals, depend-
ing on the exact nature of the conflict, but 
they must achieve these two objectives at 
minimum in order to maintain control� 
This section now turns to an analysis of 
these two state objectives� 
First, this thesis contends that states 
are concerned with the stability and safe-
ty of their own regime during a civil war� 
This is one of their primary objectives 
during a civil war because the leadership 
of the state may be harmed or killed if 
their regime’s stability is not assured� In 
the case of internal conflict, the leaders 
of the regime seek to ensure that violence 
is not used against them; thus, the lead-
ers of states are concerned with the sta-
bility of their regime and with their own 
physical safety during periods of civil war� 
Second, this thesis contends that states are 
also concerned with winning the civil war 
when war breaks out within their borders� 
In many ways, winning the civil war is an 
ancillary goal that arises due to concerns 
of regime stability, and states might be 
content to allow civil wars to endure, if 
they don’t cause too much trouble or if it 
allows the government leaders to consoli-
date their regime� So perhaps some states 
do not prioritize winning the civil war� 
With that noted, there are unique reasons 
ly, different types of capacities will mat-
ter for the policy objective selected by the 
government� For example, the objective of 
protecting citizens from foreign invasion 
requires different tools, resources, and 
abilities than does the objective of pro-
viding housing to citizens� For the first 
objective, military capacity will be an im-
portant factor – how strong is the state’s 
military, and how able is it to stop invad-
ers? But for the latter objective, fiscal ca-
pacity might be more important — how 
much money does the government have, 
and can it provide goods to its citizens? 
In these examples, we more clearly see the 
definition of state capacity because the pol-
icy objective is identified, along with the 
skills, resources, and tools a government 
needs to achieve the objective� The defini-
tion of state capacity that I advance in this 
thesis addresses Kocher’s (2010) concerns 
that “state capacity” does not hold water 
as a general concept� Kocher (2010) insists 
that researchers must identify what type 
of capacity states must have and the ob-
jectives for which that capacity is useful� I 
agree in part, contending that in order to 
talk about state capacity, researchers must 
specify the policy objective the govern-
ment seeks to achieve and whether or not 
the state has the capability to achieve it� 
However, my proposed definition departs 
from Kocher’s by noting that state capaci-
ty can cut across policy areas and that we 
can conceptualize the notion of a “strong 
state” more broadly� Under this proposed 
definition, a strong state is that which can 
set policy goals and has a variety of effec-
tive tools, resources, and skills for achiev-
ing those goals� Strong states have a broad 
repertoire of abilities and can direct their 
resources to achieving their set objectives� 
Turning to an examination of civil wars, 
let us brief ly set aside the first component 
of the theory – that states must be able to 
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tion of action after a settlement has been 
reached, and fiscal resources to maintain 
its military and to provide material bene-
fits to citizens to remove incentives to join 
the rebel group(s)� A professional and au-
tonomous bureaucracy, including military 
officer corps, can allow the state to act in 
more coordinated fashion and decrease 
the likelihood of fractionalization and 
neo-patrimonialism in the officer corps� 
Moreover, bureaucratic quality is a criti-
cal component of the first part of the pro-
posed theory of state capacity; without a 
strong bureaucracy and leadership, states 
might not even be able to set policy objec-
tives in the first place� Thus, the following 
capabilities emerge as critical elements of 
state capacity when considering the policy 
objectives of states during civil wars: (1) 
military capacity, (2) fiscal capacity, and 
(3) bureaucratic capacity� 
Now that we have adequately defined 
the key components of state capacity for 
the identified policy objectives, I now seek 
to answer the research questions posed by 
advancing hypotheses of how these three 
key elements of state capacity inf luence 
the duration and intensity of conflict�
State Capacity & Duration
First, I hypothesize that state capacity 
should increase the duration of civil wars 
because it buffers the state from potential 
rebel victory� Brandt et al� (2008) find that 
rebels win early if they win at all, meaning 
that state capacity can protect the govern-
ment in these early stages and allow them 
to hold onto control� Rebels tend to win 
early because weak states may be viewed 
as incompetent or predatory by the pop-
ulace, and at the first sign of a viable al-
ternative, the population abandons the 
incumbent government, causing it to lose 
as a function of its own weakness rather 
than as a result of rebels’ military com-
that states are concerned with ending civ-
il wars� For example, governments might 
fear losing natural resources or econom-
ic damage after a prolonged civil war; in 
addition, governments might fear inter-
ference or manipulation by foreign gov-
ernments or multinational organizations 
like the United Nations if the conditions 
of anarchy persist for too long� Moreover, 
states focus on ending civil wars because 
they need to retain the sole legitimate use 
of violence within their borders� Weber 
(1968) proposes that governments become 
sovereign when they have a monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force in a given terri-
tory� In the case of civil war, rebel groups 
intrinsically challenge this monopoly on 
violence within the nation’s borders, thus 
challenging the state’s sovereignty as 
well� Indeed, in many cases, governments 
are fighting rebel groups who seek to be-
come the new government and to possess 
that monopoly on violence� Thus, because 
states seek to retain the legitimacy of their 
regimes, states are concerned with ending 
civil war when it breaks out in their bor-
ders�
Therefore, if we accept that these are 
the two primary objectives of states 
during civil wars, an analysis of state ca-
pacity must take into account what tools 
and resources are necessary for achieving 
these two objectives� For the first objec-
tive of maintaining the stability of the re-
gime, a strong military can help maintain 
physical safety of leaders and ensure that 
the governmental structure remains safe 
and intact� Thus, an important measure of 
state capacity should be the military ca-
pacity a state possesses� For the second 
objective – ending the civil war – a vari-
ety of capabilities are useful� They include, 
but are not limited to, a military strong 
enough to defeat the insurgency, a bureau-
cracy capable of negotiation and coordina-
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using violence, meaning these cases in 
which civil wars break out are already 
above some threshold of rebel group via-
bility� This too makes rapid government 
victory more difficult� In addition, even 
very strong states may find it difficult to 
penetrate and govern effectively periph-
eral regions of their territories� If civil 
war breaks out in these regions, strong 
states may not be able to win quickly or 
may underestimate the threat posed� For 
these reasons, I argue that state capacity 
should increase the duration of civil wars� 
The following hypotheses follow from this 
theoretical argument: 
H1a: State military expenditures increase 
the duration of civil wars.
H1b: State revenues increase the duration 
of civil wars.
H1c: State bureaucratic quality increase the 
duration of civil wars. 
In line with this theory, external sup-
port for the government and external sup-
port for the rebels should increase the du-
ration of civil wars� External support, be it 
through arms, food, or funds, should give 
either side more resources to maintain the 
status quo of war� On the other hand, rebel 
strength relative to the government should 
shorten the duration of civil wars, since a 
higher relative strength would allow the 
rebels to win fast against a relatively weak 
state� Below a certain threshold, increas-
es in rebel group strength relative to the 
government might not necessarily have an 
effect on the duration of the war, since the 
government would still maintain an ad-
vantage over the rebels� However, over a 
certain threshold, increases in rebel group 
strength relative to the government might 
speed rebel victory or shorten the civil 
war� Finally, I hypothesize that rough ter-
rain lengthens civil wars because it allows 
rebel groups to squirrel away in the moun-
petence� Thus, stronger states should be 
shielded from this effect, preventing the 
rebels from winning quickly, consequently 
lengthening the duration of civil war� 
State capacity, as earlier defined, en-
tails the ability of a government to set and 
achieve its policy and military objectives� 
In the case of civil war, this thesis contends 
that states both want to maintain regime 
stability and win the civil war, but keep-
ing the regime stable is a prerequisite for 
winning the civil war� Therefore, regime 
stability is the most important concern of 
a state in the case of civil wars� I contend 
that governments are concerned primari-
ly with “ just holding on” because winning 
the war is an ancillary goal, subservient to 
making sure the leaders of the regime stay 
alive� Therefore, in the instances where 
the government cannot win a decisive vic-
tory quickly, state capacity should enable 
the governments to “ just hold on” and 
wait the rebels out� Specifically, a strong 
military means that attacks by rebels are 
less likely to cripple the state’s military 
and that the physical safety of the regime 
is more secure, both of which lengthen the 
amount of time it takes for the rebels to 
win� Therefore, I hypothesize that state 
capacity should lengthen civil wars� 
The natural follow-up question is that, 
if a state is strong, shouldn’t that allow it 
to win faster, thus shortening conflicts? 
However, this thesis still considers cases 
only where the state is weak enough to al-
low a civil war to break out in the first 
place� Perhaps winning quickly is too 
challenging for these states, and state ca-
pacity allows them to hold out, since they 
can’t outright defeat the rebels immediate-
ly� Moreover, this thesis also constitutes 
a set of cases in which the rebel group is 
strong enough to amass enough resourc-
es to decide to challenge the government 
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strategies are most effective� Thus, re-
gimes with high state capacity are more 
adept at using multiple strategies, leading 
to a decrease of battle deaths relative to 
conflicts with weaker governments, who 
may have to resort to brute force in the 
absence of more sophisticated techniques 
– or in the worst cases, cannot put up any 
credible defense�
Examining each aspect of state capaci-
ty separately confirms this theory� First, 
I predict military expenditures to be neg-
atively associated with battle deaths per 
year� Although this is initially counterin-
tuitive, states with high military expendi-
tures can be choosier about which battles 
to fight, are more able to minimize their 
own casualties, have better intelligence, 
and can participate in targeted killings 
of rebels, all of which are associated with 
lower intensity conflicts� On the other 
hand, weak states may be attacked more 
frequently, have worse intelligence (which 
may lead to mass killings in the absence 
of better information), and may not pos-
sess the officer corps, financial resources, 
equipment, or training to protect their 
personnel when attacked� As opposed to 
having military engagements foisted upon 
them by the rebel group, strong states may 
be able to take the offensive and engage 
in operations more assured to succeed� 
While at first blush, this may appear to 
increase rebel battle deaths, the state often 
has more personnel than there are rebel 
fighters� If states can minimize loss of life 
in their own ranks, which strong states 
are more capable of doing, the intensity 
of the conflict is likely to diminish� Over-
all, states with stronger militaries may be 
more cautious about using them and pos-
sess the restraint not to use them inappro-
priately, leading to fewer battle deaths� In 
addition, I hypothesize that government 
revenues and bureaucratic quality are neg-
tains, making it harder for the govern-
ment to seek them out� Moreover, a moun-
tainous terrain may make it harder for the 
rebels to access government strongholds, 
causing the war to drag on� Therefore, 
roughness of a country’s terrain should 
increase the duration of civil wars� The 
following hypotheses follow from this the-
oretical argument: 
H1d: External support for the government 
and/or rebels increases the duration of civil 
wars.
H1e: Rebel strength relative to the state de-
creases the duration of civil wars.
H1f: Rough terrain increases the duration 
of civil wars.
State Capacity & Intensity
Conflict intensity relates more strongly 
to the second objective of states when en-
gaged in civil war: winning the war itself� 
While the preservation of regime stability 
necessitates violence, winning the war re-
quires it more strongly� This thesis will 
contend that killing members of a rebel 
group is but one method of many for win-
ning a civil war� Other strategies may in-
clude stif ling recruitment, containing the 
spread of rebellion and violence, and de-
priving rebels of funding and arms, among 
others� In the second objective of winning 
civil wars, inf licting battle deaths will 
play an important role, but each strategy 
is associated with an opportunity cost� If 
a government kills rebels exclusively as its 
strategy for winning the war, it probably 
won’t be using other strategies, as it di-
verts resources away from other strategies 
toward its selected technique� Conversely, 
if a state uses techniques of non-violence 
like depriving rebels of new recruits and 
targeting supply chains, they will prob-
ably focus less on specifically inf licting 
battle deaths� Overall, states cannot have 
it all – they must pick and choose which 
16
potheses:
H2a: State military expenditures are nega-
tively associated with battle deaths.
H2b: State revenues are negatively associ-
ated with battle deaths.
H2c: State bureaucratic quality is negative-
ly associated with battle deaths.
Considering other factors on civil war 
intensity, I hypothesize that conventional 
wars should lead to higher battle deaths� 
Conventional wars – as defined by Kalyvas 
and Balcells (2014) – pit traditional armies 
against one another in pitched battles with 
clear frontlines� These wars should have 
higher battle deaths because more military 
personnel are involved in the fighting on 
both sides and because both sides possess 
more sophisticated technologies of war� 
In addition, democratization of a regime 
should suppress civil war intensity due 
to the public backlash against high battle 
deaths� In democracies, governments are 
more accountable to the populace, which 
is naturally adverse to violence� Thus, de-
mocracies have an interest in minimizing 
fatality in civil wars� The following hy-
potheses follow from these considerations: 
H2d: Conventional civil wars should expe-
rience higher battle deaths.
H2e: Democracies should experience lower 
battle deaths.
This thesis will now present my ev-
idence and approach for testing the ad-
vanced hypotheses� After the discussion of 
this study’s methodology, a presentation of 
the results of the statistical analyses and 
case studies follow�
Methodology & Case Studies
In order to answer the two research questions posed by this article, I will employ two different methods and 
sources of quantitative data� For my first 
atively associated with civil war intensity, 
since these elements of state capacity pro-
vide f lexible resources that can be used on 
a variety of governmental objectives be-
yond simply killing rebels� For example, 
higher government revenues can be used 
to provide aid to war-torn regions to min-
imize grievances and stall rebel recruit-
ment; for example, higher revenues could 
allow the state to increase public sector 
employment, addressing hypothetical reb-
el concerns about high unemployment� 
Likewise, higher bureaucratic quality can 
keep government services functioning 
during civil strife, preventing the conta-
gion of violence� A high-functioning bu-
reaucracy can also help a strong state find 
political settlements to internal conflict 
and facilitate the mediation of differences 
between warring factions�
Finally, as described before, strong 
states often face rebellions that emerge in 
peripheral regions of the country that are 
difficult to access and may not be a core 
interest for the government� This results 
in conflicts of long duration but with rel-
atively few battle deaths, since few mili-
tary confrontations occur in these internal 
conflicts� Perhaps these conflict have long 
lulls between violence or consist of long 
periods of small-scale guerilla attacks on 
police stations and military installations, 
which don’t generate as many casualties as 
pitched battles� On the other hand, when 
the state is weaker, the military challenge 
to the state tends to be more serious and 
can challenge the government in both ru-
ral and urban areas� In these circumstanc-
es, military defections may occur, and the 
rebel groups may be relatively strong and 
well-mobilized� Consistent with my pre-
dictions about duration, these conflicts 
should be associated with shorter duration 
but higher intensity� From these theoret-
ical arguments emerge the following hy-
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army, government revenues, and bureau-
cratic quality� For military expenditures, 
I used data from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators on military ex-
penditures as a percentage of GDP� I then 
lagged the variable by one year to ref lect 
the fact that the effect of an increase in 
military spending may take some time to 
reveal itself� For government revenues, I 
also relied on the World Development In-
dicators’ time series data on government 
revenues excluding grants as a percentage 
of that country’s GDP� Finally, for bureau-
cratic quality, I used data from the PRS 
Group’s (2017) International Country Risk 
Guide, which since 1984 has assigned each 
country a yearly score on a scale of 1-6 
rating the quality of its bureaucracy�
Other control variables I included as 
suggested by the literature include (1) log 
total population, (2) log GDP per capita, (3) 
whether or not the civil war took place in 
the Cold War, (4) ethnic fractionalization, 
(5) roughness of the country’s terrain, (6) 
how democratic the country is, (7) relative 
strength of the rebel group, (8) external 
support for the government and rebels, 
and (9) “veto players,” or how many dyads 
are present in the conflict� I will discuss 
the sources and treatment of each of these 
variables in turn� 
First and second, I obtained data on 
each country’s population and its per cap-
ita GDP from the World Development In-
dicators and then took the natural log of 
each observation� Third, I constructed a 
dummy variable for whether the civil war 
occurred after the Cold War (1 is yes, 0 
is no)� Fourth, I took a measure of eth-
nic fractionalization (the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization measure) from Kalyvas 
and Balcells’ (2014) replication data, which 
measures the ethnic fractionalization of a 
country using the multitude of languages 
research question – why do some civil 
wars last longer than others? – I use Cox 
proportional hazard models to examine 
which factors are salient for impacting the 
length of a civil war conflict� For my sec-
ond research question –– why are some 
civil wars more intense than others? – I 
employ a regression analysis to find the 
statistically significant predictors of in-
tensity of conflict� Per the suggestions of 
Hendrix (2010) and Kocher (2010), and as 
described above, I intend to use three in-
dependent measures of state capacity: (1) 
military capacity, (2) fiscal capacity, and 
(3) bureaucratic capacity� After I detail 
my methodology and data sources for my 
quantitative analysis, I will explicate the 
selection of and research for my case stud-
ies�
Research Question 1 (Duration)
For my first research question, regard-
ing the duration of civil wars, I construct-
ed a dataset based on the UCDP Dyadic 
Dataset, version 1-2016, which consists of 
all armed conflicts occurring from 1946-
2015� In the UCDP dataset, an armed 
conflict is defined as “a contested incom-
patibility that concerns government and/
or territory where the use of armed force 
between two parties, of which at least one 
is the government of a state, results in at 
least 25 battle-related deaths in a calen-
dar year�” Each observation in the dataset 
represents a conflict between a govern-
ment and a rebel group, as opposed to the 
conflict-year version, where each observa-
tion represents a conflict between a gov-
ernment and all rebel groups opposing it� 
My dataset consists of 587 conflict dyads, 
and my dependent variable is the time, in 
years, each dyad lasts, which I calculated 
based on the start and end dates of each 
dyad� To test my hypotheses, I obtained 
data on military expenditures, size of 
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intensity variable only codes conflicts as 
minor (between 25 and 999 battle-related 
deaths in a given year) or full-scale war 
(1,000 or greater battle-related deaths in 
a given year), and many conflicts do not 
change between minor and full-scale over 
their duration� To remedy this, I rely on 
data from the UCDP Battle Deaths Data-
set, version 5�0, which is compatible with 
the UCDP Dyadic Dataset and contains 
data on battle deaths (soldiers and ci-
vilians killed in combat) in state-based 
armed conflicts between the years 1989-
2015 (Melander, Pettersson, & Themner, 
2016)� The Battle Deaths Dataset only 
counts deaths caused by the warring par-
ties that can be directly related to com-
bat; it does not, for example, include civil-
ians who die due to disease or starvation 
caused by the conflict� Therefore, this 
dataset only measures the intensity of mil-
itary confrontations, not the war’s wider 
impact on loss of life� From this dataset, 
I used the best estimate of annual battle 
fatalities, of which I then took the natural 
log� To test my hypotheses, I use the same 
independent variables for state capacity 
as my first research question� In terms of 
control variables, I use these same inde-
pendent variables from my first research 
question: log population, log GDP per 
capita, relative rebel strength, ethnic frac-
tionalization, post-Cold War, Polity score, 
and roughness of the country’s terrain� I 
included three different variables based on 
the prior literature review of conflict in-
tensity, in which I evaluated whether each 
civil war in my dataset was a conventional, 
irregular, or SNC war by using Kalyvas 
and Balcells’ (2014) measures�
After compiling this data, I treated 
the dataset as time-series cross-sectional 
data and created a panel dataset based on 
dyad-year observations� I then created a 
random effects linear model for panel data 
spoken in the nation as a proxy� Fifth, I 
obtained a measure of how mountainous 
each country is from Kalyvas and Balcells 
(2014), since several studies point to rough 
terrain as a factor in the intensity of civil 
war� Sixth, I obtained each nation’s Poli-
ty score from the Polity IV dataset; high-
er values correspond to more democratic 
countries, while lower values refer to more 
autocratic countries� Seventh, I used a mea-
sure of relative rebel strength from Cun-
ningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2013)’s 
Nonstate Actor Dataset� This measure is 
coded on a scale of -2 to 2, with -2 mean-
ing the rebels are much weaker than the 
government, -1 meaning they are merely 
weaker than the government, 0 meaning 
the government and rebels are at parity, 
1 meaning the rebels are stronger than 
the government, and 2 meaning the rebels 
are much stronger than the government� 
Thus, positive scores indicate that the 
rebels have a military advantage over the 
government� Eighth, I obtained data for 
external support for the government and 
rebels from the UCDP External Support 
Dataset (Primary Warring Party Data-
set), which states whether or not external 
support was provided to the government 
and rebel groups (Högbladh, Pettersson, 
& Themner, 2011)� Ninth and finally, for 
the “veto players” variable, I summed the 
number of dyads active in each conflict at 
the time of the observation� I then created 
a set of Cox proportional hazard models, 
introducing more covariates each time� 
The results are presented in subsequent 
sections�
Research Question 2 (Intensity)
For my second research question, re-
garding the impact of state capacity on the 
intensity of civil wars, I also constructed a 
dataset based on the UCDP Dyadic Data-
set, version 1-2016� In this dataset, the 
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ment revenues to understand the strength 
of the Zairian state as the war unfolded� 
After developing a timeline of the major 
events in the war, I referred to secondary 
sources for commentary regarding the in-
f luence of state capacity on the Zairian gov-
ernment strategy in the war� In the second 
case, due to the richness of the scholarship 
regarding the Troubles, I relied mainly on 
secondary sources in my consideration of 
this second case study� I again constructed 
a timeline of major events of the Troubles 
to understand the evolution of the conflict, 
after which I consulted secondary sources 
for their arguments regarding British pol-
icy at the time, namely Neumann (2003), 
Woodwell (2005), Edwards (2010), and 
Weitzer (1987)� Throughout this process, I 
referred to primary sources of British pol-
icy, namely Cabinet papers and transcripts 
of debates in the House of Commons, along 
with British newspapers reporting on the 
development of the conflict� Following the 
presentation of the major events and shifts 
in British response, I analyzed how British 
state capacity may have aided or hindered 
its government in the search for solutions�
This thesis will now present the find-
ings of its quantitative study, after which 




Beginning with the effect of state capacity on civil war duration, the average length of the 587 dyads in 
the PRIO/UCDP dataset is 6�189 years� 
Figure 1 displays the Kaplan-Meier sur-
vival function for all civil war dyads coded 
in my dataset� The graph shows that most 
conflicts between a government and a reb-
el group tend to be resolved quickly, while 
and tested the introduction of covariates 
on the natural log of battle deaths in each 
dyad-year� I tested for heteroskedasticity 




This thesis presents two case studies: 
the First Congo War and the Troubles of 
Northern Ireland� These cases were chosen 
because they provide examples of an ex-
tremely weak and extremely strong state, 
respectively� On the one hand, in the First 
Congo War, the Zairian state had basical-
ly ceased to exist, allowing the outbreak 
of civil war� As will be discussed later, the 
tax collection system of the Zairian state 
was virtually nonexistent, and the military 
suffered from multiple problems of lack of 
professionalism, low pay, and terrorization 
of the population� Zaire’s incredible weak-
ness allows this thesis to examine con-
f lict duration and intensity under circum-
stances of low state capacity� On the other 
hand, the Troubles of Northern Ireland 
was chosen as a case study because it rep-
resents the other end of the spectrum of 
state strength� Northern Ireland is ruled 
by the United Kingdom and, as such, is a 
province of one of the strongest states in 
the world� Despite this high level of state 
capacity, violent challenges to the state’s 
authority occurred� This case was select-
ed because it may reveal how strong states 
behave when faced with internal conflict�
After the cases were selected, I began 
research into the First Congo War� To 
research and draw conclusions about the 
inf luence of state capacity on the develop-
ment of the conflict, I first consulted pri-
mary source documents, namely African 
newspapers, to construct a timeline of the 
war� I also examined the aforementioned 
data on military expenditures and govern-
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els 2 through 5, I add more covariates, 
including ethnic fractionalization, rough-
ness of terrain, Polity score, and relative 
rebel strength� In these models, post-Cold 
War and log population retain their sign 
and statistical significance� In addition, 
lagged military expenditures achieves sta-
tistical significance with a negative sign, 
meaning that military capacity is associat-
ed with longer conflicts, as hypothesized� 
And finally, in models 6 and 7 of Table 
1, I add external support for rebels/gov-
ernment and veto players respectively� In 
these models, fiscal capacity, as measured 
through government revenues, achieves 
statistical significance with a negative 
sign, indicating that fiscal capacity caus-
es conflicts to endure longer� In addition, 
other variables like rough terrain and eth-
nic fractionalization become statistically 
significant at the p<0�1 level, both with 
negative signs, meaning that they increase 
the duration of civil wars� This confirms 
hypothesis 1f, that rough terrain is asso-
ciated with increased civil war duration� 
In addition, in model 7 of Table 1, rela-
tive rebel strength is statistically signif-
icant at the p<0�05 level, indicating that 
rebel strength makes civil wars end soon-
er� This is as I hypothesized in 1e, given 
that a higher relative strength would al-
low rebels to win fast against a state that’s 
relatively weak compared to them� Final-
ly, external support is negatively correlat-
ed with the hazard rate and is significant 
at the p<0�01 level – external support for 
both the rebels and the government seems 
to lengthen civil wars substantially, con-
firming hypothesis 1d�
In Tables 2, 3, and 4 (contained in the 
appendix), I test for robustness of my 
findings regarding state capacity� Each 
of these models contains the same con-
trol variables as Table 1 with only one 
a select few conflicts persist many years, 
even decades�
In order to test Hypotheses 1a through 
1f, I run several Cox proportional hazard 
models, estimating the effect of state ca-
pacity on the hazard of a civil war end-
ing� In model 1 of Table 1, I test for the 
impact of three measures of state capacity 
on the duration of civil wars� Negative co-
efficients mean a negative association with 
the hazard rate of termination; thus, neg-
ative coefficients indicate longer conflicts� 
In model 1 of Table 1, the only statisti-
cally significant variables are the log pop-
ulation of a country and whether or not 
the conflict occurred after the Cold War; 
the former makes conflicts longer, and 
the latter makes conflicts shorter� This 
second finding tentatively confirms H1d, 
that external support for the government 
or rebels should lengthen civil wars, as 
the post-Cold War era has been associated 
with a dramatic reduction in the amount 
of funding and arms contributed from the 
two warring superpowers� 
Moving rightward on Table 1, in mod-
Figure 1� Duration of civil wars�
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also contained in the appendix, presents 
the duration of civil war with each of the 
three measures of state capacity held at 
their 75th percentiles� As the results of the 
Cox proportional hazard models would in-
dicate, the Kaplan-Meier curves show that 
holding military expenditures and gov-
ernment revenues at their 75th percentile 
moves the curve outward, meaning that 
military and fiscal capacity lengthens civil 
wars� Predictably, the survival curves for 
bureaucratic quality above and below the 
75th percentile are quite similar� 
The findings of Table 1 confirm my 
hypothesis that state capacity contributes 
to longer civil wars� States with higher 
military expenditures and greater fiscal 
measure of state capacity included� Table 
2 contains military capacity, Table 3 con-
tains fiscal capacity, and Table 4 contains 
bureaucratic capacity� In each of these sets 
of models, each of my measure of state ca-
pacity retains the same statistical signifi-
cance and sign of Table 1, confirming my 
findings that military expenditures and 
government revenues are strong predic-
tors of how long a conflict will last, while 
bureaucratic quality fails to achieve sta-
tistical significance� In addition, variables 
such as relative rebel strength, external 
support, rough terrain, log population, 
and post-Cold War tend to maintain their 
statistical significance and sign of coef-
ficient, which indicates that my findings 
are robust� To provide a visual, Figure 3, 
Table 1� Impact of state capacity on conflict duration
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Intensity
To investigate the effect of state ca-
pacity on civil war intensity, I created a 
time series cross-sectional dataset with 
dyad-year as the unit of observation� Table 
5 tests all three measures of state capacity 
on battle deaths per year� Beginning with 
models 1 and 2 in Table 5, nothing except 
the lagged dependent variable is statisti-
cally significant� Initially, military expen-
ditures seems to be positively correlated 
with battle deaths per year, but in mod-
el 3, military expenditures becomes neg-
atively associated with intensity of civil 
war and achieves statistical significance� 
When ethnic fractionalization is added, it 
seems to suppress battle deaths per year 
as well� Moving rightward, in model 4, I 
add the type of war (conventional, irregu-
lar, or SNC) to the model, and we see that 
conventional wars and irregular wars are 
statistically significant and positively cor-
related with battle deaths per year� Final-
ly, in model 5 of Table 5, military expendi-
tures retains its statistical significance, as 
do the dummy variables for conventional 
and irregular wars� In addition, a coun-
try’s Polity score is negatively correlated 
with intensity, meaning that more dem-
ocratic countries experience less intense 
conflicts� 
In Tables 6, 7, and 8 (found in the ap-
pendix), I test for robustness by includ-
ing just one of the three measures of state 
capacity in the models� Table 6 contains 
models with military expenditures, Table 
7 contains models with government rev-
enues, and Table 8 contains models with 
bureaucratic quality� In each of these sets 
of models, the coefficients of the three 
measures of state capacity retain their 
negative signs, and only military expendi-
tures is statistically significant, as in Ta-
ble 5� This confirms hypothesis 2a, but we 
resources are able to prolong conflicts, es-
pecially when they are unable to win out-
right� These strong states may also expe-
rience civil wars in far-off regions where 
they are unable to project power, making 
it difficult for them to win quickly� These 
states may have militaries strong enough 
to withstand rebel attacks and capable 
enough to protect the physical safety of 
the regime, lengthening the rebels’ time 
to victory as well� Surprisingly, bureau-
cratic quality does not follow this trend, 
as it has a positive coefficient, meaning 
that more effective bureaucracies end civ-
il wars sooner� This might occur because 
stronger bureaucracies are more capable 
of credibly committing to a negotiated set-
tlement, and they can negotiate faster� In 
addition, stronger bureaucracies can crip-
ple recruitment efforts of rebels and more 
effectively control the press, both of which 
might prevent the rebels from winning or 
allow the government to win faster, thus 
shortening the civil war� Bureaucracies 
are also unlikely to “offend” or frighten 
citizens of the country in the way that dis-
plays of military strength might; in this 
sense, the exercise of government strength 
through the bureaucracy might not in-
f lame the population against the state in 
the same way that f lexing the military 
forces might� Finally, external support for 
the government and/or rebels causes wars 
to drag on because both sides have more 
resources available to them, which either 
prevents them from being defeated or dis-
incentivizes them from negotiating� As a 
result, the post-Cold War era sees shorter 
conflicts since this external support is less 
available to governments and rebels alike� 
But as one predicted, when the rebels are 
stronger than the government, civil wars 
are shorter in duration – simply because 
rebels can win faster� 
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correlated with intensity level of a con-
f lict� One might expect that ethnic frac-
tionalization increases the intensity of 
conflict; greater levels of ethnic fraction-
alization may make the state more willing 
to kill rebels because combatants on both 
sides may be more likely to belong to dif-
ferent religions, making it easier to dehu-
manize and “otherize” the enemy� In addi-
tion, ethnic fractionalization may increase 
the strength and unity of rebel groups, 
leading to increased deaths due to the reb-
els successfully killing more government 
combatants� However, the results of my 
regression analyses require further exam-
ination of this hypothesis� Perhaps ethnic 
fractionalization is negatively correlated 
with civil war intensity levels due to the 
way conflict dyads were constructed for 
cannot confirm H2b and H2c, although 
the signs of their coefficients are negative� 
Conventional and irregular wars continue 
to be strongly positively correlated with 
battle deaths, and a country’s Polity score 
continues to be negatively correlated with 
intensity, indicating that democracy can 
attenuate violence when civil war breaks 
out� Therefore, we can confirm both H2d 
and H2e – conventional civil wars appear 
to be more intense, and civil wars in dem-
ocratic countries appear to experience few-
er deaths� Thus, my findings appear to be 
robust to the inclusion of control variables 
and across different measures of state ca-
pacity�
A surprising finding is that ethnic frac-
tionalization is consistently negatively 
Table 5� Impact of state capacity on conflict intensity�
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first place� In this latter case, weak states 
cannot protect their own troops or shield 
civilians from collateral damage� In both 
cases, weak states experience more intense 
conflicts� As expected, conventional civil 
wars experience greater amounts of casu-
alties, given that these wars pit two strong 
armies against one another in convention-
al warfare, causing high amounts of battle-
field fatalities� Finally, democratic coun-
tries must be more careful when fighting a 
civil war, because high casualties threaten 
the stability and electability of the current 
government� As a result, democracies ex-
perience less intense civil wars�
The next section provides two case 
studies to illustrate how stronger states 
may experience internal conflict that is 
longer but less intense than average� The 
first case study, the First Congo War, pro-
vides an example of a weak state that ex-
perienced a short but bloody civil war� In 
this example, an unprofessional military 
and a limited government revenue base 
prevented the regime in Kinshasa from 
forestalling the end of the civil war and 
protecting its own personnel and citizens 
from violence� In the second case study, 
the Troubles of Northern Ireland, a strong 
state was challenged by sectarian violence 
in a peripheral region of its country and 
spent nearly thirty years seeking a politi-
cal settlement to the conflict with the lim-
ited use of military force�
Case Studies
First Congo War
Ever since its independence from Belgium, Congo has exhibited many of the hallmarks of a weak 
state� When it achieved independence in 
1960, a lack of central authority and re-
gional fragmentation enabled high levels 
the purposes of this research� As described 
above, this study treats one state paired 
with one rebel group as a conflict dyad, as 
opposed to one state paired with all rebel 
groups fighting at once� This might lead 
to lower battle deaths in each conflict dyad 
measured but possibly high overall bat-
tle-deaths across all rebel groups� States 
with higher levels of ethnic fractionaliza-
tion might theoretically have more rebel 
groups and sides involved in the conflict; 
thus, there might be low battle-deaths in 
a conflict against a government and one 
rebel group but high total battle-deaths 
when accounting for the entire war with 
all rebel groups� Therefore, the total num-
ber of deaths in a conflict might be posi-
tively correlated with ethnic fractionaliza-
tion, raising a possible question for future 
research of ethnic fractionalization’s im-
pact on conflict-wide intensity� 
To summarize, the picture that emerges 
from these findings is one of strong states 
that can contain conflicts, protect civil-
ians and their own troops, kill rebels with 
more precision and intelligence, and pick 
their battles� States with high military ex-
penditures may be able to procure more 
sophisticated technologies of warfare and 
be choosier in the battles they fight, min-
imizing casualties on their own side and 
killing only the rebels that are necessary 
for victory� And while government reve-
nues and bureaucratic quality were not sta-
tistically significant, their coefficient was 
negative, indicating that these measures of 
state strength likely provide governments 
with f lexible resources to fight civil wars 
in non-violent ways, such as the provision 
of aid to war-torn regions or the search 
for political solutions to internal conflicts� 
Weak states must either resort to tremen-
dous violence in the absence of other co-
ercive tools to seek victory, or they do not 
possess the tools to inf lict violence in the 
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mind, Mobutu systematically rechanneled 
resources earmarked for the military to-
wards his Presidential Guard (Shearer, 
1999)� This lack of investment eventually 
came back to haunt Mobutu in the 1970s, 
when the regime faced internal rebellion 
in the two Katanga rebellions� When faced 
with this internal conflict, Mobutu had to 
outsource the protection of the national 
defense to Moroccan and French troops 
to compensate for Zaire’s weak army (Cal-
laghy, 1984)� Even after this threat abated, 
Mobutu continued to neglect the military, 
refusing to pay Zaire’s military personnel 
with state funds� Instead, he encouraged 
them to seek payment through extortion 
of the citizenry, such as kidnapping for 
ransom or looting (Reno, 1998)� Michael 
Shafer (1982) summarizes the importance 
of the military in Zairian politics as re-
sulting in “Mobutu’s extraordinary ef-
forts to divide, control, manipulate, politi-
cize, and otherwise deinstitutionalize and 
de-professionalize it�” Overall, the Zairian 
military was ill-equipped to handle the 
coming civil war that would soon tear the 
region apart�
Second, a strong state needs taxation 
and revenues in order to survive, and the 
Zairian state struggled to obtain these 
revenues� The Zairian tax collection sys-
tem was fraudulent and ineffectual� The 
World Development Indicators (2016) data 
show Zaire’s tax revenues in the 1970s 
and 1980s at a measly 6-11 percent of the 
country’s GDP, a number which dropped 
to 5 percent of GDP by 1995� For compari-
son, the WDI data show the United States 
at roughly 18 percent of GDP around the 
same time, which is considered a low lev-
el of tax collection by Western standards� 
Moreover, Callaghy (1984) notes that so 
many economic transactions were being 
conducted in the Zairian black market that 
the actual tax burden on Zaire’s citizens 
of political violence and division, espe-
cially along ethnic lines (Young & Turn-
er, 1985)� Political mobilization in Congo 
occurred on ethnic lines not due to rigid 
ethnic identities – and in fact, many schol-
ars describe the considerable f luidity of 
Congolese ethnic identities at the time – 
but rather due to the lack of state legiti-
macy and institutions (Breuilly, 1994)� In 
the absence of this central power, Chief 
of the Army Mobutu Sese Seko staged a 
coup in 1965 and established his regime 
in the state he renamed Zaire (Young & 
Turner, 1985)� While the relative weak-
ness of the government is not unusual for 
a state emerging from colonial rule, what 
is unusual about Congo is just how weak 
it remained for decades� As the post-coup 
decades went on, the Zairian state weak-
ened in the three key measures of state 
strength advanced by this thesis: (1) mil-
itary strength, (2) revenue collection and 
government spending, and (3) bureaucrat-
ic quality� This thesis will first illustrate 
this decline in state strength, after which 
it presents the evolution of Zairian con-
f lict� This section will end by arguing that 
the quick but intense victory of the rebels 
in the first Congo War was related to the 
lack of Zairian state capacity� 
State Decline
First, due to a lack of serious internal or 
external challenges to its authority, Mobu-
tu’s regime could afford to have a corrupt, 
ineffective, and weak military� The main 
role of the Zairian national army (FAZ) 
was to promote internal security with 
little consideration of national defense 
(O’Ballance, 2000)� Mobutu understood 
well the risk that a strong military could 
pose to a ruler, having himself seized pow-
er in a coup� Thus, the Mobutu regime 
had a vested interest in maintaining a 
weak military (Atzili, 2007)� With this in 
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er (1985) describe how Kinshasa was only 
home to 6 percent of Zaire’s population 
but was allocated 31 percent of the bud-
get for government investments� On the 
other hand, Kasai Province held nearly 20 
percent of the country’s population and re-
ceived virtually no funds� Overall, the rev-
enue collection of the Zairian regime was 
far from robust, and even when it managed 
to collect funds, the government rarely 
spent its revenues equitably or effectively�
Third and finally, an effective state 
must rely on bureaucracies and institu-
tions to set and achieve governmental 
objectives� Zaire also lacked this quality 
of an strong state� As Young and Turner 
(1985) note, the state of Zaire did not ex-
ist in a meaningful sense outside of Mobu-
tu’s personal authority� Although Mobu-
tu originally paid lip service to building 
Zaire’s institutions – namely through his 
1967 founding of the Popular Movement 
of the Revolution, Zaire’s sole political 
party – these institutions performed few 
services and often merely allowed Mobutu 
to further his personal control over the ed-
ucation system, the military, and regional 
authorities (Atzili, 2007)� In the absence of 
meaningful reforms, Mobutu waged two 
public relations campaigns: “Authenticity” 
in 1971 and “Mobutism” in 1974� These 
public relations campaigns, coupled with 
milquetoast economic reforms like Zair-
ianization and “Radicalization” in 1974, 
represented Mobutu’s attempts to curry 
favor with the populace and other African 
leaders through rhetoric (Callaghy, 1984)� 
Much like he downsized the military, 
Mobutu preferred to shrink the size of the 
Zairian bureaucracy, fearful of the threat it 
could pose as an independent power base, 
and instead relied on a network of clients 
to provide state services (Reno, 1998)� By 
1975, faced with growing foreign debt and 
economic woes caused by the falling price 
was probably miniscule� In the absence of 
a robust tax collection system, Mobutu re-
lied on external support, foreign debt, and 
short-term policies to sustain the network 
of patrimony he used to control the state 
(Atzili, 2007)� Young and Turner (1985) 
describe how Mobutu seized vast swaths 
of land and commercial enterprises owned 
by foreign nationals in a movement he 
called “Zairianization�” This immense se-
questration of economic resources allowed 
Mobutu to distribute even more goods 
to the political class, thus bolstering his 
patrimonial system� Therefore, the lack of 
consistent revenues greatly crippled the 
ability of the Zairian state to plan, budget, 
and deliver public services� 
But even when there were revenues to 
spend, the Mobutu regime “spent little on 
public goods, and when it did, the focus 
was mostly on extravagant, highly visi-
ble, and often misguided projects” (Atzili, 
2007, p� 159)� For example, the govern-
ment poured nearly a billion dollars into 
the construction of the Ingha-Shaba Dam 
and an associated high-power grid that 
transferred the dam’s energy to the near-
by Shaba mines, projects which could have 
used much cheaper energy sources� While 
these lavish, high-profile infrastructure 
development continued, state spending on 
social services dwindled from 17�5 percent 
in 1972 to under 1 percent in 1992 (Le-
marchand, 2001)� Moreover, as the years 
went on, more and more money was di-
verted from the state’s budget to a discre-
tionary fund for the president – by 1992, 
95 percent of Zaire’s annual budget went 
either to Mobutu’s personal accounts or 
to the accounts of his beneficiaries (Atzili, 
2007)� Even when the government spent 
funds on investment projects, peripheral 
provinces were marginalized, while the 
capital and core regions received the li-
on’s share of investment� Young and Turn-
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Banyamulenge, along with other minori-
ty ethnic groups across the country, climb 
to top political positions in the eastern re-
gions, hoping to prevent more populous 
ethnicities from coalescing into credible 
opposition (Autesserre, 2008)� This move 
exacerbated existing ethnic grievances, as 
manifested in the Kanyarwandan War, in 
which members of the Hunde and Nande 
ethnic groups massacred Rwandan emi-
grants (Lemarchand, 2009)� In 1981, in 
an attempt to improve his popularity in 
the region, Mobutu too eventually turned 
against the Banyamulenge, portraying 
them as “Rwandans” (Weinstein, 2000)� 
Throughout the mid-1990s, the Hunde, 
Nande, and Nyanga regularly attacked the 
Banyamulenge, killing 14,000 Tutsis in 
the process (Lemarchand, 2009)�
The definitive event that precipitated 
the First Congo War was the outbreak of 
the Rwandan genocide� During the 100-
day genocide, nearly 800,000 Tutsis were 
slaughtered by Hutu aggressors, which 
caused Tutsis to f lee en masse from the 
country in an exodus that was called the 
Great Lakes refugee crisis (Straus, 2013)� 
The Rwandan genocide was brought to an 
end in July 1994 by the overthrow of the 
Hutu government in Kigali by the Tut-
si-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front� 
Over the course of the crisis, 1�5 million 
refugees f led across the border to eastern 
Zaire, including Tutsis who f led the Hutu 
génocidaires but also those that feared re-
prisal from new Tutsi RPF regime� This 
latter group consisted of the génocidaires 
themselves, the former Rwandan army 
(FAR), and independent Hutu paramili-
tary groups known as the Interahamwe 
(Reyntjens, 2009)� Many of these second 
group of refugees took up residence in ref-
ugee camps in the Kivu region of Zaire 
and established the camps as bases for re-
arming themselves (Weinstein, 2000)� In 
of copper, Mobutu abandoned even the 
pretense of nation building and chose to 
protect his own authority by monopoliz-
ing resources for himself and his patrimo-
nial network (Weinstein, 2000)� This shift 
away from institution building paved the 
way for state deterioration and, eventual-
ly, civil war� Overall, the Zairian state had 
a weak military, poor revenue extraction, 
ineffective government spending and dis-
tribution of public goods, and incompetent 
bureaucracies and institutions� All of these 
deficiencies contributed to its loss of legit-
imacy in the eyes of the people, leading to 
the onset of the First Congo War, as de-
scribed in the next section�
Onset of Civil War 
For centuries, tensions had existed be-
tween various ethnic groups in eastern 
Zaire, and these tensions would eventually 
contribute to the onset of the First Con-
go War� Since the 1800s, members of the 
semi-nomadic Tutsi tribe had emigrated 
to eastern Zaire, some forcibly relocated 
to Congo to perform manual labor for Bel-
gian colonialists and others later f leeing 
the 1950s social revolution that brought 
the Hutus to power in Rwanda (Lemarch-
and, 2009)� Tutsis who emigrated from 
Rwanda before Congolese independence in 
1960 are referred to as Banyamulenge and 
had the right to citizenship under Zair-
ian law (Vlassenroot, 2002)� After Zaire 
achieved independence, Tutsis contin-
ued to emigrate from Rwanda, and these 
latecomers were known as Banyarwanda� 
However, “native” locals – members of the 
Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga ethnic groups 
– often failed to distinguish between the 
two Tutsi groups, referring to them both 
as Banyamulenge and treating them as 
foreigners (Mollel, 2008)� After solidi-
fying his control of the country in the 
1960s, Mobutu helped select members of 
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began to spiral out of control in late 1996, 
other enemies of Mobutu in multiple sec-
tors joined forces with the Banyamulenge 
in what they named the Alliance for Dem-
ocratic Forces for the Liberation of Con-
go (AFDL)� The AFDL fought under the 
banner of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, a former 
Marxist rebel who led one of the three 
major rebel groups that combined into 
the AFDL (Quinn, 2004)� The violence 
in east Zaire in October 1996 is regarded 
by scholars as the beginnings of the First 
Congo War� The next section describes 
the progression of the conflict and its res-
olution through the toppling of Mobutu a 
bloody seven months later�
Progression of the War. 
By late October, the AFDL had de-
feated the Zairian forces occupying Uvi-
ra and Bukavu, and the AFDL controlled 
the land between the two cities� See Fig-
ure 4 for a map of the AFDL offensive in 
the First Congo War� As an AfricaFocus 
bulletin reported on October 26th, 1996, 
“The FAZ are losing territory and re-
treating, sometimes even before engaging 
the rebels” (IRIN Briefing, 1996)� In a re-
sponse to this rapid territorial loss, on No-
vember 20th, 1996, Mobutu suspended the 
Zairian Army Chief of Staff, General Elu-
ki Monga Aundu, and replaced him with 
Lieutenant-General Mahele Bokungo Lie-
ko, who had a successful history of crush-
ing armed rebellion� In addition, Mobutu 
transferred the Presidential Division and 
Civil Guard under Mahele’s direct com-
mand, providing the FAZ with superior 
quantities and quality of arms (“Mobutu 
Appoints,” 1996)� However, Mobutu’s at-
tempts to reform the military seemed to 
be in vain� The FAZ continued to back-
pedal into the end of the year, as the rebels 
controlled Uvira, Bukavu, Goma, Bunia, 
Walikale, Butembo, and Lubero by De-
the first half of 1996, nearly one hundred 
Tutsi – Rwandan and Zairian Banyamu-
lenge – died per month in attacks launched 
over the Zaire-Rwanda border from resi-
dents of refugee camps (Gribbin, 2005)� In 
response to the massive inf lux of refugees 
over its borders, the Zairian Parliament 
ordered all peoples of Rwandan or Bu-
rundian descent to be repatriated to their 
countries, including the Banyamulenge 
(Lemarchand, 2009)� However, many ref-
ugees resisted repatriation, and the Hutu 
génocidaires grew bolder as Mobutu ac-
tively supported their training and sup-
plied them for an invasion of Rwanda 
(Reyntjens, 2009)� As attacks from Hutus 
harboring inside Zaire continued, the new 
RPF leadership in Kigali began to train 
and equip the Banyamulenge in order to 
protect themselves from cross-border at-
tacks from Hutu refugees (Shearer, 1999)�
The long-simmering ethnic tensions fi-
nally boiled over in an exchange of gun-
fire between Rwandan Tutsi and Zairian 
Green Berets on August 31st, 1996 (Reyn-
tjens, 2009)� This battle marked the be-
ginning of the Banyamulenge Rebellion, 
the primary goal of which was to expel 
extremist Hutu forces from east Zaire 
and seize power in the Kivu provinces� 
The government in Kigali finally chose 
to deploy its Tutsi militias for operations 
in Zaire, and on October 7th, 1996, the 
Rwandan government supported Banyam-
ulenge who began an uprising in the Kivu 
town of Bukavu, after the vice-governor 
based there proclaimed that Banyamu-
lenge would have to leave (Solomon, 1997)� 
The Banyamulenge managed to fend off 
an attack by the FAZ, causing tensions 
to rise between Rwanda and Zaire, which 
eventually culminated in an exchange of 
mortar fire over Lake Kivu between the 
two nations’ armed forces (Reyntjens, 
2009)� As the Banyamulenge Rebellion 
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in the rebel advance, temporarily satisfy-
ing them and giving them buffer against 
the former génocidaires� This pause con-
tinued until late January 1997 (Reyntjens, 
2009)� During this time, the AFDL and 
Rwandan forces committed many atroc-
ities against Hutu refugees, and Amnes-
ty International (1998) estimates that as 
many as 200,000 Rwandese Hutu refu-
gees were massacred in this time� While 
the AFDL and RPF carefully managed 
NGO and press access to the areas where 
these atrocities occurred, the United Na-
cember (Solomon, 1997)� As a reporter 
from Business Day in Johannesburg not-
ed in January 1997, “The rebel movement 
that was born in the hills of east Zaire ef-
fortlessly routed the army, seized towns, 
dismantled refugee camps and sent thou-
sands of recalcitrant Rwandans home� 
Nothing, it seemed last year, could halt 
the Alliance of Democratic Forces for 
the Liberation of Congo-Zaire” (Wrong, 
1997a)� This capture of nearly 800 x 100 
km of territory along the border of Rwan-
da, Uganda, and Burundi caused a pause 
Figure 4� Map of AFDL offensives from Stearns (2012)�
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rebels on February 25th, and those pres-
ent described the takeover as orderly and 
peaceful: “They were disciplined, so we 
knew they were not Zairian troops,” re-
marked an American procurer for the 
Catholic Church� The takeover of Kali-
ma put the AFDL in charge of a 1450 km 
strip of territory (“Refugees f lee camp,” 
1997)� Around this time, nine senior offi-
cers of the FAZ defected to join the rebels 
in late February� The officers cited “low 
morale, years of low wages, and dismal 
living conditions … but what demoral-
ized them the most was a two-tiered army 
command – one from the armed forces and 
the other from a ground of underground 
commanders close to Mobutu” (“Reports 
of Zairean troops looting,” 1997)� As Wil-
liams (1997) argues, “Armies founded on 
internal pacification are always better at 
bullying and terrorizing the local popu-
lace than fighting a well-disciplined force� 
The Zairian army rapidly disintegrated, 
exposing Mobutu’s soft underbelly�” With 
the FAZ in shambles, the southern AFDL 
forces captured Kindu with ease by mid-
March, and the northern pincer traveled 
down from Isiro to capture Kisangani, the 
third-largest city in Zaire and also the 
site of the local headquarters of the FAZ 
(“While the relief basics pour in,” 1997)�
Next, the AFDL set its sights on 
Lubumbashi in the south, the country’s 
second largest city and hub of copper and 
cobalt mining� On its march south, the 
AFDL took Pweto, and regional military 
sources remarked that “[t]he rebels took 
Pweto with little fighting because gov-
ernment troops were afraid of their ad-
vance and afraid of popular anger directed 
against them by residents” (“Zairean city 
is next target,” 1997)� The AFDL next 
prepared a pincer movement on Lubum-
bashi from Kamina in the northwest and 
Kasenga in the northeast� In early April, 
tions Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights later conducted a mapping 
exercise of atrocities in the First Congo 
War and documented the killing of tens 
of thousands of Hutu civilians (United Na-
tions Office, 2009)� 
After a quiet start to 1997, the Mobu-
tu regime announced a counter-offensive 
against the AFDL in the eastern provinc-
es� Mobutu hired European and African 
mercenaries around January 20th, along 
with members of the Angolese UNITA 
and Rwanda’s exiled Hutu army (“Belgian 
leads,” 1997)� Revealing the weakness of 
the state, government troops resorted to 
looting, banditry, and exactions as they 
f led in disarray from towns across the 
country (“14 Zairean Soldiers,” 1997)� The 
Zairian counteroffensive placed the front-
line at the central towns of Walikale and 
Tingi-Tingi, pinning 400,000 refugees 
between the advancing FAZ troops and 
the AFDL� However, with the rebels’ cap-
ture of the Lake Tanyanyika port of Kale-
mie around February 3rd, 1997, the gov-
ernment’s counter-offensive faltered, and 
the AFDL proceeded to handily seize Pu-
nya, Moba, the Tingi-Tingi refugee camp, 
and Lubutu by mid-February (“Calls for 
Zairean premier,” 1997)� By this point, 
blaming his neglect of the army for the 
rebels’ steady advance, opposition newspa-
pers took to openly poking fun at Mobutu’s 
prostate cancer, and the rapid depreciation 
of the Zairian currency caused citizens to 
start referring to the zaire as “prostates” 
(“Mobutu cracks down,” 1997)� 
The AFDL then headed westward in 
two pincer movements, the north of which 
eventually took Isiro, putting it in con-
trol of 1000 km of territory along Zaire’s 
eastern border (Mills, 1997)� The south-
ern pincer movement began with Kalima 
and its refugee camp, which fell to the 
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(“UN alarmed,” 1997)� Given the conflict’s 
high levels of civilian victimization, the 
international community had attempted to 
negotiate a settlement throughout the war, 
but now, growing increasingly fearful of 
the instability of the country, South Af-
rica finally succeeded, with Mobutu and 
Kabila agreeing to peace talks hosted by 
Nelson Mandela (Laufer, 1997)� However, 
these peace talks were largely unsuccess-
ful, with Mobutu only agreeing to step 
down after a long transition period, while 
Kabila demanded Mobutu’s immediate res-
ignation (“Zaire: Mobutu said ‘willing to 
step down,’” 1997)� Reyntjens (2009) con-
tends that the AFDL did not take these 
negotiations seriously but instead partici-
pated only to appear willing to attempt a 
diplomatic solution, while still continuing 
to press steadily onwards�
After repeated international attempts 
to bring both parties to the table again, 
the AFDL eventually reached striking 
distance of Kinshasa’s airport around May 
6th (“US presses Kabila,” 1997)� Tensions 
ran high in Kinshasa for the next two 
weeks, as residents expected the rebels 
to attack from multiple directions, final-
ly activating their long-promised western 
front by ordering in hundreds of Katan-
gese fighters waiting across the Ango-
lan border (Wrong, 1997c)� Attempts to 
mount a more serious defense were un-
dermined by Mobutu’s worsening cash 
crisis; since the rebels seized Zaire’s dia-
mond and copper-producing regions, the 
oil industry was virtually the govern-
ment’s only source of revenue� Business-
men reported Prime Minister Gen Likulia 
Bolongo “ha[d] gone cap in hand to lead-
ing companies, demanding contributions� 
At the central bank, the presses [kept] 
printing money, but with the highest de-
nomination worth just $0�28, the proce-
dure produce[d] little in terms of money 
they captured the diamond capital Mbu-
ji-Mayi, where “[t]raders said Zairian sol-
diers based in the town were nowhere to 
be seen” (“Zaire’s rebels push on,” 1997)� 
Over time, it became apparent that the 
FAZ’s counter-strategy appeared root-
ed in minimal resistance, when it chose 
to fight back at all� The rebels captured 
Lubumbashi in mid-April, where they 
were cheered by residents ready for regime 
change, and despite the rebels’ capture of 
these mineral-rich regions, mining compa-
nies expressed confidence that ratification 
of their existing deals could be concluded 
with rebel leaders (“Mobutu battles to re-
gain,” 1997)� Later that month, on April 
17th, American Mineral Fields sealed a $1 
billion deal to develop the Kolwezi copper 
tailings project in Zaire through a back-
door agreement with the AFDL, giving 
Kabila a much-needed boost of revenue 
(“Zairean rebel leader Kabila,” 1997)� 
The AFDL captured three more towns 
by April 25th and routed the north and 
south pincer movements to advance 
steadily on Kinshasa from the Bandundu 
province in the north and from Kikwit in 
the east (“Seven years after,” 1997)� While 
the AFDL troops marched inexorably 
onwards, Kabila paused to meet with in-
ternational officials to discuss the fate of 
85,000 Hutu refugees who disappeared 
south of Kisangani� This was not the first 
time the AFDL was accused of commit-
ting atrocities, as the UN refugee agen-
cy reported claims of three mass graves 
near the empty refugee camps of Kibum-
ba, Katale, and Kilimanyako (“Hundreds 
of f leeing Hutus,” 1997)� Kabila brushed 
off the concerns of international media-
tors, calling the disappearance of these 
refugees “a little problem”� The AFDL 
was also under international heat for the 
massacre of thousands of refugees in the 
Tingi-Tingi refugee camp in early March 
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Analysis 
The First Congo War provides an exam-
ple of a short but bloody civil war in which 
the state was weak, and the weakness of 
Zaire contributed both to the short dura-
tion of the war and also its high intensity� 
First, state weakness likely contributed to 
the short duration of the First Congo War 
due to the weakness of the Zairian mili-
tary and the government’s limited revenue 
collection� Throughout the war, the FAZ 
failed to stop the AFDL advance and, on 
many occasions, chose not to fight back at 
all� Often, Zairian soldiers were nowhere 
to be seen, as the rebels took city after city 
(“Zaire’s rebels push on,” 1997)� As Solo-
mon (1997) notes, “As the war continued, 
it became obvious that Mobutu’s generals 
did not have a military counter-strategy 
… even with a military plan, Kinshasa 
would not have the available soldiers to 
transport to the battlefield�” While it is 
impossible to say for certain, the war may 
have lasted longer if the Zairian army had 
posed more of a credible threat or won 
even a few battles� 
Moreover, the FAZ often did the work 
of recruitment for the rebels through their 
looting and pillaging of towns, causing lo-
cal citizens to celebrate when the AFDL 
finally arrived� A more professional mil-
itary and higher military expenditures 
to pay personnel may have prevented the 
rapid disintegration of the Zairian forces 
when faced with the AFDL threat� Even if 
Mobutu still eventually lost, it is likely that 
he would have held on at least marginally 
longer if his military had been more able 
or willing to fight back� Similarly, a lack 
of government revenues severely crippled 
the Mobutu regime by the end of the war� 
As the AFDL seized region after region, 
Mobutu’s neo-patrimonial network began 
to collapse, giving the regime few sourc-
supply” (Wrong, 1997b)� In a desperate at-
tempt to shore up the military in the final 
days of the war, the authorities also tried 
to launch a military recruitment drive at 
the university in Kinshasa� Traditionally, 
the student population supported the rad-
ical opposition� As one student remarked 
to the South African Business Day news-
paper on May 8th, “Joining the losing side 
at this late stage did not seem a good idea” 
(Wrong, 1997b)�
On May 12th, the AFDL resumed its 
march towards Kinshasa, abandoning its 
pledge to Mandela to wait for a second 
round of peace talks� And by May 17th, 
1997, the rebels marched triumphantly 
through Kinshasa, cheered by onlookers 
and met with isolated resistance (“ANC 
congratulates,” 1997)� The AFDL fanned 
throughout the city, captured Mobutu’s 
riverside palace and its nearby fortified 
military base, and ordered government 
troops to surrender their weapons by the 
end of the day� Zairian soldiers readily 
complied, eager to tie white cloths around 
their heads to show their support for Kabi-
la� “Today, we finally feel free,” said for-
mer army captain William Mazaza to the 
South African Business Day as he hand-
ed in his weapons to the AFDL (“Reb-
els stamp their authority,” 1997)� Nelson 
Mandela remarked, “As far as Kabila is 
concerned, he will enter Kinshasa without 
bloodshed� His troops have been acknowl-
edged, even by his enemies, as being dis-
ciplined and courteous” (“Mandela: Kabila 
doing ‘excellent’ job,” 1997)� In an address 
to the nation, Kabila proclaimed himself 
president on May 17 and immediately or-
dered a violent crackdown to restore order 
to the country� He then reorganized the 
nation under the name it goes by today – 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo�
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technologies, low military expenditures, 
and untrained personnel all contributed 
to high loss of life in the Zairian forces, 
indicating that weak states may be less 
able to protect themselves in battle� While 
weaker states may also be unable to inf lict 
heavy casualties on rebel groups, their in-
ability to minimize their own casualties 
might explain the negative correlation be-
tween state strength and intensity of civil 
wars� In the example of the First Congo 
War, a weak state was unable to protect 
itself from loss of civilian and military life, 
unable to raise the funds to mount a na-
tional defense, and unable to forestall the 
toppling of its own regime, even if only for 
a few months� Thus, the Zairian case ex-
emplifies how state strength may be pos-
itively correlated with civil war duration 
and negatively correlated with intensity�
The Troubles 
On the other hand, the Troubles of Northern Ireland represent a case in which a strong state – in fact, 
one of the strongest states in the world, 
the United Kingdom – experienced inter-
nal conflict with low intensity and long 
duration� For nearly thirty years, between 
1969 and 1998, Northern Ireland, a prov-
ince of the United Kingdom, experienced 
ethnic conflict over the constitutional 
and political status of the province vis-
à-vis Britain; over the course of the con-
f lict, 3,532 people died, of whom 1,841 
were civilians (Fay, Morrissey, Morrisey, 
& Smyth, 1999)� By virtue of the fact that 
this case is thirty years in length, while 
the Zaire’s civil war lasted only seven 
months, this study will devote consider-
ably more time to outlining the develop-
ments in the internal conflict� This case 
study begins with a discussion of the geo-
graphic, political, and ethnic tensions that 
existed prior to the outbreak of internal 
es of revenue� By the end, as the rebels 
approached Kinshasa, the meager oil in-
dustry was the only source of cash for the 
government, forcing the Prime Minister 
to beg for contributions from businesses 
(Wrong, 1997b)� Higher government rev-
enues may have prevented the war from 
ending so quickly, as Mobutu may have 
been able to divert funds to paying per-
sonnel, hiring more mercenaries, or buy-
ing more military equipment� To these 
ends, state weakness likely contributed to 
the short duration of the war�
Second, the intensity of the First Congo 
War is also likely related to the weakness 
of the Zairian state� Compared to other 
civil wars, Zaire saw relatively high bat-
tle deaths� The median number of annu-
al battle deaths in the Battle Deaths 5�0 
dataset is 189 deaths per year, while the 
First Congo War saw 5,761 casualties in 
just seven months of conflict (Lacina & 
Gleditsch, 2005)� Figure 5 contains a his-
togram of average battle deaths per year 
for all conflicts noted in the UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset� Moreover, the 
Battle Deaths Dataset does not include ci-
vilian deaths, which occurred in startling 
amounts in the First Congo War� As stat-
ed earlier, some estimates of civilian vic-
timization in the war number in the hun-
dreds of thousands, indicating that weak 
states may not be able to protect civilians 
from the rebel group once civil war breaks 
out (Amnesty International, 1998)� 
Moreover, undisciplined government 
forces may turn to looting, pillaging, and 
inf licting violence upon the civilian popu-
lation in the absence of formal remunera-
tion� In the case of Zaire, Mobutu encour-
aged such behavior, reportedly asking his 
soldiers once why they needed salaries 
when they had guns instead (“Congo’s 
Curse,” 2010)� Moreover, unsophisticated 
34
the beginning of the British treatment of 
Ireland as a region on its periphery� Frus-
trated by this treatment, the Republican 
rebellion of the 1790s first articulated the 
principle of the unity of the Irish people, 
as well as their separation from England� 
Having previously granted legislative in-
dependence to an Irish parliament in 1782, 
the unrest caused by this insurrection ul-
timately caused London to resume the di-
rect government of the island in the early 
1800s (Foster, 1989)� The Act of Union 
in 1801 abolished this Irish parliament in 
Dublin and formally annexed the island 
of Ireland to Great Britain, which laid the 
roots for a conflict between supporters of 
the United Kingdom and supporters of 
Irish Nationalism� 
In 1845-49, the infamous Great Irish 
Famine occurred, when a potato blight 
destroyed two-thirds of Irish potatoes, 
leading to an estimated 1 million deaths� 
London’s response to this crisis was de-
cidedly lackluster, marked by public relief 
schemes being abandoned in 1846 by the 
newly-elected Whig government and the 
continued selling of Irish potatoes abroad 
(Foster, 1989)� Neumann (2003) character-
izes London’s response to the famine as 
one of “initial disinterest, aloofness, and 
crisis management” (p� 12)� Gradually over 
the nineteenth century, recognizing their 
failure in governance during the famine, 
British politicians developed the solution 
of “home rule,” which granted Dublin in-
dependence in a number of policy areas 
while maintaining constitutional linkages 
to the United Kingdom (Murphy, 1986)� 
The introduction of a modest home rule 
bill in 1912 sufficiently alarmed Union-
ists in Northern Ireland, causing Union-
ists and Nationalists to form paramilitary 
organizations to defend their respective 
causes (Foster, 1989)� In 1919, anger bub-
bled over as the Irish War of Independence 
conflict, followed by an explanation of the 
evolution of the conflict�
Background
The root grievance held by participants 
in the Troubles centered around the con-
stitutional status of Northern Ireland� The 
majority of Northern Ireland’s population 
were unionists, who wanted Northern Ire-
land to remain in the United Kingdom, 
and many of whom were Protestant de-
scendants of colonists from Great Brit-
ain� However, a significant minority were 
Catholic and nationalists, who wanted 
Northern Ireland to unite with the Repub-
lic of Ireland, creating a unified Ireland in-
dependent of Great Britain (Foster, 1989)� 
Even to this day, public polling shows that 
unionists tend to see themselves as Brit-
ish, and nationalists tend to identify as 
Irish (Northern Ireland Life and Times, 
2014)� Thus, the conflict took place along 
political, religious, and ethnic lines, much 
of which was caused by Anglo-Irish histo-
ry leading up to the Troubles�
Nationalists contend that Anglo-Irish 
history started in the year 1170, when 
Strongbow and other Normans invaded 
Ireland, but it is arguable whether the so-
called Old English actually can be consid-
ered “English” (Kee, 1989)� Regardless, 
only in the sixteenth century did the loose 
relationship between the island of Great 
Britain and the island of Ireland begin to 
shift� By the death of Elizabeth I in 1602, 
the monarchy “could properly claim to 
have conquered most of Ireland” (Adelman 
& Pearce, 2001, p� 3)� Shortly thereafter, 
settlers from Scotland and England es-
tablished a Protestant community in Ire-
land, and between the early seventeenth 
and late eighteenth century, the British 
government exercised only informal and 
loose control over Ireland, preferring to 
treat it as a ‘place apart�’ This marked 
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each ideology will be referred to as Loy-
alism (for Unionism) and Republicanism 
(for Nationalism)� In addition, because 
there were fewer Catholics in Northern 
Ireland, this thesis occasionally uses the 
terminology of majority/minority to refer 
respectively to Protestants and Catholics� 
Over the next sections, this thesis will de-
tail the evolution of the conflict over five 
distinct periods: 1969-72, 1972-75, 1976-
82, 1982-88, and 1989-98� Throughout 
the discussion of the conflict, this thesis 
will pay particular attention to the evolu-
tion of British military, economic, and po-
litical strategies� After each section, this 
thesis will consider how the case of the 
Troubles may be illustrative of some of the 
earlier arguments regarding state capaci-
ty: namely, that strong states tend to ex-
perience longer but less intense conflicts 
on average�
1969 – 1972 
Before August 15th, 1969, the primary 
British military strategy was to avoid the 
deployment of British troops (Neumann, 
2003)� But the Northern Ireland riots of 
August 1969, in which six Catholics and 
two Protestants were shot dead and 133 
were treated for gunshot wounds, forced 
the British government to respond by de-
ploying the British Army on the streets 
of Northern Ireland (Kelley, 1982)� When 
the British government agreed to provide 
these troops “in aid of the civil power,” 
it had decided that its primary aim was 
the re-insulation of Great Britain from 
the conflict occurring in Northern Ire-
land – meaning, London sought to avoid 
contagion of the conflict to the mainland 
(Neumann, 2003)� Immediately, then, the 
objective was to revitalize the Stormont 
system of Irish home rule, which would 
restore the constitutional status quo be-
fore the war� But this did not appear to be 
broke out� After the resolution of this war, 
an act of British parliament partitioned 
the island of Ireland into Northern Ireland 
and Southern Ireland, the latter of which 
became the Irish Free State in 1922� 1921 
represents the formal creation of the prov-
ince of Northern Ireland as a separate en-
tity, which before was merely a collection 
of six counties in Ireland� 
However, the partition of Ireland into 
Northern Ireland and the southern Repub-
lic of Ireland exacerbated the ethnic con-
f lict within the province� Northern Ireland 
consisted mainly of Protestants who want-
ed to remain in the United Kingdom, but a 
significant minority of Catholic National-
ists still wanted Northern Ireland to join 
the Republic of Ireland� Especially after 
the end of the Second World War, tensions 
continued to build and eventually came to 
a head in the late 1960s� Around this time, 
several Nationalist civil rights marches 
occurred, many of which were attacked by 
Unionists, and Unionist organizations be-
gan to organize counter-demonstrations 
(Neumann, 2003)� The conflict finally 
boiled over in August 1969, when the Brit-
ish Army was deployed to the streets of 
Northern Ireland after riots and attacks 
in Belfast, marking the beginning of the 
Troubles� The Troubles pitted republi-
can paramilitaries such as the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) against loy-
alist paramilitaries such as the Ulster Vol-
unteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense 
Association (UDA)� British state security 
forces, including the British Army and the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), even-
tually became embroiled in the conflict�
As a brief note, this thesis will refer 
generally to Unionists and Nationalists 
as groups of individuals who wanted re-
spectively to remain in or leave the Unit-
ed Kingdom� The more radical strains of 
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cess as possible” to ensure the protection 
of civil rights (Hansard Archives of the 
House of Commons [Hansard], 1970)� As 
Neumann (2003) puts it, “[t]here was no 
point in embarking on a mission to assert 
the authority of constitutional government 
if its defense involved the abolition of what 
one wanted to preserve” (p� 29)� 
In addition to military strategy, the 
British government also implemented in 
1969 an agenda of political reforms� Re-
sults from the Cameron Commission’s 
report showed that Catholics harbored 
many political and social grievances re-
garding the allocation of housing, jobs, 
and the manipulation of electoral bound-
aries� Protestants, on the other hand, were 
concerned about the constitutional status 
of Northern Ireland as a part of the UK 
(Cameron, 1969)� In response to this find-
ing, the British government encouraged 
a series of legal safeguards, such as a law 
against the incitement of religious hatred, 
the establishment of a Commissioner for 
Complaints, and the creation of a Minis-
try for Community Relations (Neumann, 
2003)� In addition, criticisms of local po-
licing were noted led to three new policies: 
(1) the RUC, the police force in Northern 
Ireland, was made into a “British” police 
force, (2) the Ulster Special Constabulary 
was disbanded in the wake of criticisms of 
Protestant partisanship, and (3) the Ulster 
Defense Regiment (UDR) was established 
under the command of the British Army 
as a new locally recruited part-time force� 
By late 1969, though, the British mili-
tary strategy of minimum force had been 
interpreted as “minimum action,” and 
the newly appointed English head of the 
RUC even described his approach as “soft-
ly, softly” (“Military police take over,” 
1969)� In practice, this allowed Protestant 
marches to intensify, and “no go” areas in 
a long term strategy: as early as August 
19th, 1969, Home Secretary James Cal-
laghan stated it was “urgent” to “press on 
with the reorganization of the regular po-
lice forces” (Public Record Office [PRO], 
1969)� It became clear that the govern-
ment’s priority was to ensure the swift 
withdrawal of British troops and to pro-
tect the British mainland�
Moreover, British strategic thinking 
around this time seemed to center around 
two major principles: first, the principle of 
minimum force, and second, the mainte-
nance of civilian government� In the first 
principle, the security forces’ role is regard-
ed as obeying the duty to respond to force 
only with what is absolutely necessary to 
restore law and order (Mockaitis, 1995)� 
To this end, British government officials 
believed there could be no “military solu-
tion” – to coerce the population through 
violence or put down any violent expres-
sion with military means alone would have 
violated the principle of minimum force� 
It was also regarded as counterproduc-
tive: a solution would have to be found “by 
proper parliamentary, constitutional, and 
electoral processes, [because] this is the 
British way of doing things”, said Arthur 
Young, the newly-appointed head of the 
RUC (“Military police take over,” 1969)� 
In a similar vein, the British government 
wanted to preserve “as normal a legal pro-
Northern Irish citizens juxtaposed against 
British Marines (Hillen, 1980)�
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longer a merely intercommunal matter; 
and a situation approaching armed con-
f lict was developing” (PRO, 1971)� At this 
point, British policy shifted towards to 
“eliminating the hard core of terrorists” 
(Hansard, 1971a)� However, the securi-
ty forces’ campaign was always meant to 
be limited, and the British forces reject-
ed the notion that any means would have 
justified the defeat of the IRA (“Progress 
in Ulster,” 1971)� In line with this tenta-
tiveness, London attempted to accelerate 
the “swift exit” of British forces through 
heavy reliance on the locally-recruited 
UDR (Hansard, 1971b)� London also de-
volved considerable decision-making au-
thority to the Army; for example, London 
declared legality as the only guideline in 
relation to the level of force, which was 
vague and never translated into simple op-
erating procedures (Neumann, 2003)�
On August 9th, 1971, anger bubbled over 
when the British Army introduced intern-
ment� At dawn, armed soldiers launched 
raids and arrested 342 people suspected of 
involvement with the IRA, most of whom 
who had no links to the Republican para-
militaries (Spjut, 1986)� This precipitated 
four days of violence in which twenty-four 
people died, and internment marked the 
complete alienation of the Catholic com-
munity from the existing structures of 
government (Neumann, 2003)� In turn, 
this allowed the IRA to ratchet up its 
military campaign; in the six months pri-
or to internment, there were twenty-five 
deaths, but the following six months saw 
185 deaths (Hansard, 1972)� Internment 
demonstrated that British reliance on 
purely repressive means of addressing the 
situation were counterproductive� Around 
this time, the failure of London’s political 
strategy became apparent as well� After 
British soldiers shot dead two Catholic ci-
vilians in Free Derry in July 1971, riots 
Derry-City and West-Belfast were estab-
lished, creating pockets where the IRA 
was free to organize (Kelley, 1982)� Britain 
also initially failed to recognize the IRA as 
a credible threat, and by early 1970, riots 
became a part of everyday life (Neumann, 
2003)� By this point, the Provisional IRA 
had split from the Official IRA, and the 
Provisional IRA (henceforth referred to as 
the IRA) successfully baited the security 
forces into a repressive reaction, allowing 
them to skillfully escalate their campaign 
to the point they gained the confidence 
to launch an offensive against the British 
forces (Smith, 2002)�
The conflict escalated in mid-1970 
with intense riots erupting in parts of 
Derry and Belfast, leading to gun bat-
tles between unionists and nationalists 
in which seven people were killed (Bell, 
1993)� However, the British government 
characterized this renewed outbreak of 
violence as a combination of excessive 
drinking, long evenings, boredom, and a 
“taste of excitement” on behalf of Catho-
lic teenagers (Wilsworth, 1970)� Early in 
July 1970, a British Army raid in the Low-
er Falls district of Belfast sparked a riot 
and gun battles between soldiers and the 
Official IRA� Following this escalation of 
violence, the British Army imposed a 36-
hour curfew and raided hundreds of homes 
after gassing the neighborhood with CS 
gas (Campbell & Connelly, 2003)� Schol-
ars have found the Falls Curfew created a 
negative backlash effect, where the Brit-
ish Army’s actions may have contributed 
to IRA recruitment (Duffy, 2009; LaFree, 
Dugan, & Korte, 2009)� 
It took until February 1971 for Lord 
Carrington, then Secretary of State for 
Defense, to acknowledge that “the recent 
riots represented a new phase in the cam-
paign of violence� The disorder was no 
38
ing about “an acceptable level of violence” 
(Chartes, 1971)� Around the same time, 
London began to reconsider the viabili-
ty of home rule, or devolving powers to a 
Northern Irish legislative body� Maudling 
began to advocate openly for power-shar-
ing in which minority representation was 
guaranteed as early as March 1972 (PRO, 
1972a)� However, this memorandum was 
met with mixed reception by the Cabi-
net, and on March 30th, 1972, the British 
government dissolved Northern Ireland’s 
Government and Parliament, instituting 
direct rule from Westminster and taking 
over the governance of the province (Neu-
mann, 2003)� 
These early years of 1969-72 exemplify 
three major themes of this case study as it 
relates to the correlation between state ca-
pacity and duration/intensity of conflict� 
First, the early years of the Troubles in-
dicated that strong states like the United 
Kingdom may underestimate the severity 
of civil unrest in peripheral regions� Nat-
urally, in London, the state’s monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force was taken 
for granted, but in Northern Ireland, no 
wide consensus existed about the role or 
responsibility of the security forces (Neu-
mann, 2003)� To put a finer point on it, in 
Northern Ireland, members of the commu-
nity were actively resisting the execution 
of state authority� By this time, London 
was well-accustomed to its subjects reject-
ing British authority, given its recent ex-
perience with the decommissioning of its 
colonial empire, but for Northern Ireland 
citizens – who were represented in Parlia-
ment, were equal under British law, and 
could participate via normal channels of 
government – to resort to such violence 
was unthinkable to Westminster� Even 
when entering the conflict, the British 
government did not seem to grasp the 
severity of the grievances and the deeply 
erupted in the city, and the Social Demo-
cratic and Labour Party (SDLP) – the ma-
jor Nationalist political party – protested 
by withdrawing from the Parliament of 
Northern Ireland in Stormont (Bell, 1993)� 
The conflict continued to escalate into 
1972, when, on January 30th, the British 
army shot twenty-six unarmed civilians, 
thirteen of whom were killed, during an 
anti-internment demonstration in Derry 
(Conway, 2003)� The event became known 
as “Bloody Sunday” and was the highest 
death toll from a single shooting incident 
during the conflict in Northern Ireland� 
Subsequent violence, namely during the 
funerals of eleven of those killed on Bloody 
Sunday and the detonation of multiple car 
bombs throughout February and March, 
gradually led the British government real-
ize that the IRA could not be defeated mil-
itarily (Neumann, 2003)� Harry Tuzo, the 
commanding officer of the British Army 
in Northern Ireland at the time, described 
the IRA’s military campaign as “an ac-
tivity that could be carried on until they 
choose to desist finally from what they are 
doing” (quoted in Kelly, 1976)� This meant 
that defeating the IRA as a precondition 
for political progress was no longer via-
ble, and Reginald Maudling, then Home 
Secretary of the British government, came 
to view the military as a tool for bring-
Northern Irish girl watches member of 
paramilitary (Belfast Forum, 2011)�
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economic solutions lengthened the con-
f lict� London’s vast array of policy options 
may have been an embarrassment of rich-
es, and in this way, the number of resourc-
es possessed by strong states might cause 
indecision on the part of policymakers� 
Perhaps if London chose to respond with 
more military resoluteness or prevented 
IRA activity in the early years, the Trou-
bles may have ended sooner� 
1972 – 1975
The British government initially re-
garded the abolition of the Northern Irish 
Parliament in Stormont as a temporary 
measure (Neumann, 2003)� It retained 
not only its vision of Northern Ireland as 
‘a place apart’ but also its desire to insu-
late the British mainland from political 
conflict in the province� To achieve these 
ends, the British government gradually 
came to appreciate devolution as the best 
arrangement, but self-government had to 
be supplemented by a cross-community 
coalition to mitigate sectarian divisions� 
This would eventually lead to signing of 
the Sunningdale Agreement in late 1973, 
but prior to that, beginning in 1972, Brit-
ain began to recognize that its political 
and military aims were crucially inter-
twined (Neumann, 2003)� 
In the early stages of direct rule, Brit-
ain struggled to balance the competing 
imperatives placed on its military� Dual 
mandates existed for the British Army, 
including stopping paramilitary activi-
ty while simultaneously “regaining the 
trust” of the minority Catholic community 
(Neumann, 2003)� As Lord Windlesham, 
a Minister of State under Home Secretary 
William Whitelaw, explained it, London’s 
policy at this time contained twin objec-
tives: “British policy rests on the security 
forces in Northern Ireland countering ef-
fectively and impartially, the use of force 
divided nature of the society: the princi-
pal objective of the intervention in Au-
gust 1969 was simply, as Home Secretary 
Callaghan put it, not “to get sucked into 
the Irish bog” (Callaghan, 1973, p� 15)� In-
deed the British Army would fail in this 
endeavor, as twenty-six long years of con-
f lict awaited it in ‘the Irish bog�’
Second, the case of the Troubles indi-
cates that strong states may fail to strike 
a balance on what constitutes an appropri-
ate use of military force in responding to 
internal conflict – either being too timid 
or too repressive� The British Army os-
cillated between these two extremes over 
the first three years of the Troubles: on 
the one hand, the security forces were un-
willing to take extreme military action to 
eliminate terrorists altogether, which lead 
to the establishment of “no go” areas where 
the IRA was free to organize� On the oth-
er hand, the British Army swung too far 
in the other direction with internment, 
which may have increased the duration of 
the conflict, as it handed proverbial am-
munition to IRA for use in its recruitment 
campaigns� London learned through the 
internment that solely repressive ways of 
ending the conflict would fail� This lead to 
the third major theme exemplified by this 
case study: the idea that strong states may 
attempt other solutions, such as econom-
ic or political reforms, in the absence of 
a definitive military strategy� The British 
government tried many political reforms, 
such as altering laws regarding discrim-
ination towards the minority community 
and changing the composition of the po-
lice force� It also attempted economic solu-
tions through providing employment to 
Northern Irish citizens (Neumann, 2003)� 
While these solutions may have eventually 
contributed to the solution of the conflict 
many years later, it is arguable that the 
oscillation between military and political/
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which paved the way for the signature of 
the Sunningdale Agreement in December 
1973 (Smith & Neumann, 2005)�
The Sunningdale Agreement attempt-
ed to establish a power-sharing North-
ern Ireland Executive and a cross-border 
Council of Ireland� However, in its con-
struction of the power-sharing agreement, 
Westminster assumed that Unionists 
cared much more about devolution and 
home rule, when they really were con-
cerned with constitutional stability that 
would prevent a united Ireland (Neumann, 
2003)� Unionists began to feel that “new 
Stormont” would cause Britain to sell out 
Northern Ireland� Declarations from the 
Home Secretary Maudling that “[i]f, by 
agreement, the North and South should at 
some time to come together in a United 
Ireland … not only would we not obstruct 
that solution, but … the whole British 
people would warmly welcome it” surely 
didn’t help matters (quoted in Rees, 1985, 
p� 277)� Structural imbalances towards the 
Nationalists and continuing violence con-
tributed to this feeling of unease, and over 
the next months, Unionist opposition, vi-
olence, and a loyalist general strike cased 
the collapse of the Northern Ireland Ex-
ecutive in May 1974 (O’Leary & McGar-
ry, 1996)� After this, Britain re-introduced 
direct rule�
Despite the failure of Sunningdale, 
Neumann (2003) argues that the British 
government still did not understand that 
power-sharing would work only if the ma-
jority was assured of Northern Ireland’s 
constitutional status (p� 97)� Failing to 
grasp the true source of Loyalist discon-
tent, London developed a new strategy of 
“Ulster nationalism�” A major component 
of Ulster nationalism involved changes 
to British military strategy described as 
“Normalization,” which consisted of two 
… by extremists of whatever kind� At 
the same time, the government is work-
ing towards a new form of administration 
in Northern Ireland” (“Ulster beyond,” 
1972)� Another concern of the British gov-
ernment emanated from its commitment 
to political and constitutional solutions: to 
this end, a lower level of violence was ben-
eficial (Edwards, 2020)� These conflicting 
objectives led to the scaling down of secu-
rity forces in Catholic areas, and this fail-
ure to maintain military pressure on the 
IRA allowed them “to regroup and extend 
their inf luence” (Dewar, 1985, p� 64)� It 
also resulted in the rise of Loyalist para-
military activity, since the lax policing of 
Catholic communities raised Unionist sus-
picions about the commitment of the Brit-
ish forces to neutrality (Edwards, 2010)�
In late May 1972, the IRA exploded 
twenty-two bombs in Belfast in what be-
came known as “Bloody Friday�” In re-
sponse, two months later, on July 31st, 
the British Army launched Operation Mo-
torman, in which they deployed 12,000 
soldiers to re-take the “no-go areas” the 
IRA had been using for recruitment and 
operations (Sanders, 2013)� Motorman was 
a limited military operation in the sense 
that it demonstrated overwhelming mili-
tary strength in combination with explicit 
warnings about the character and timing 
of the operation� As such, it was done “to 
encourage the more responsible elements 
to keep the streets clear” (PRO, 1972b)� 
Scholars credit the Motorman operation 
for its benefit to British intelligence, which 
contributed to a reduction of paramilitary 
activity: in the three weeks before Motor-
man, there were 2,595 shooting incidents 
across Northern Ireland, but in the three 
weeks after, only 380 shooting incidents 
occurred (Smith, 2002)� In addition, Mo-
torman strengthened the SDLP’s resolve 
to participate in constitutional politics, 
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with the British government and Northern 
Ireland Office� The British government 
agreed to the ceasefire, eager to convert 
these “men of violence” to peaceful means 
and encourage all parties to commit to a 
settlement (Dixon, 2001)� Incident centers 
were established to monitor the ceasefire, 
and the establishment of these centers was 
also seen as additional encouragement for 
Republicans to enter the political process 
(Dixon, 2008)� O’Brien (1999) notes that 
the British government sponsored what 
would soon become Sinn Fein’s first of-
fices and even offered to help with public 
relations if the Republicans would par-
ticipate in the elec¬¬tions� Despite all 
of London’s efforts, it soon became clear 
that the Republicans would not go polit-
ical (McKittrick & McVea, 2002)� Just as 
Westminster failed to appreciate the im-
portance of constitutional stability to the 
Unionists, it overestimated the degree of 
compromise Republicans would be willing 
to make on their ultimate goal of a united 
Ireland (Neumann, 2003)� The first major 
breach of the February truce occurred in 
July 1975, when four British soldiers were 
killed by an IRA bomb near Forkill, and 
the violence re-escalated shortly thereaf-
ter, with six more major attacks occurring 
before November (Kelley, 1982)� 
This period of the Troubles came to an 
end on December 5, 1975, when the Brit-
ish Army ended the policy of internment 
in accordance with its new Normalization 
policy (Spjut, 1986)� In that time, 1,981 
people were interned, and the interroga-
tion techniques used on internees have 
been described by the European Commis-
sion on Human Rights in 1976 as torture 
(Sanders, 2012)� 1975 drew to a close with 
many Unionists viewing the introduction 
of Normalization with unease: Neumann 
(2003) contends that, in practice, the in-
troduction of the policy – with its reduc-
major components: policy primacy and 
“Criminalization” (O’Leary, 1989)� Police 
primacy aimed for the indigenous police 
force, the RUC, to take over all law en-
forcement, while Criminalization abol-
ished the use of detention and assignment 
of Special Category status to paramilitary 
prisoners (Campbell & Connolly, 2003)� 
Contrary to its first impression, Normal-
ization did not in fact have the purpose of 
a “swift exit” but rather was aimed at mak-
ing the engagement more sustainable for 
the British forces in the long term (Ken-
nedy-Pipe, 2014)� The British government, 
it appeared, was in it for the long haul� 
However, Neumann (2003) argues that the 
introduction of Normalization in 1974-75 
represented “a missed opportunity to de-
feat the IRA by military means” (p� 83)� 
Public outcry after the Birmingham pub 
bombings, where twenty-one English ci-
vilians were killed in November 1974, and 
severe damage to IRA military capabili-
ties from Operation Motorman may have 
allowed the British Army to strike a fatal 
blow against the IRA (Neumann, 2003)� 
However, preferring to focus on political 
and constitutional solutions, the British 
government diverted its energies to the 
implementation of Normalization (Han-
sard, 1975)�
In late 1974 and early December 1975, 
the IRA agreed to a truce and ceasefire 
Belfast IRA man on patrol 
(Belfast Telegraph, 1987)�
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use of security forces in Catholic areas, 
which allowed the IRA to regroup� This, 
too, may have lengthened the conflict and 
serves as another example of a strong 
state struggling to strike a good balance 
with its use of military force� The British 
government seemed to reach that happy 
medium in Operation Motorman, which 
was applauded by scholars for its effective-
ness despite its limited scope� Both Mo-
torman and its warning of civilians before 
its implementation exemplify how strong 
states may experience internal conflict of 
a lower intensity; states with high capacity 
may be able to protect civilians and their 
own troops when employed in military op-
erations� And while some scholars believe 
the IRA could have been defeated alto-
gether in the mid-1970s, this is certain-
ly up for debate� Instead of striking down 
more heavily against the IRA during this 
time, the British government focused on 
the third theme of strong states – polit-
ical, economic, and constitutional solu-
tions, like Sunningdale, Criminalization, 
and inducements for Republicans to par-
ticipate in the political process� Although 
each of these policies would fail in turn, 
the British reliance on them illustrates 
how strong states may prefer to use other 
tools in their toolboxes in lieu of military 
force, thus decreasing the intensity of civil 
war – and possibly lengthening it� 
1976 – 1982 
This period was characterized by the 
longest continued period of undiminished 
British direct rule� Going into 1976, the 
British government decided that no new 
constitutional initiatives would be pursued 
before a stable constitutional, political, 
military, and economic order was estab-
lished (Neumann, 2003)� While devolution 
and power-sharing continued to be the 
primary British objective, its actualization 
tion of British troops, release of detainees, 
and sustaining of the IRA ceasefire – in-
dicated to many observers the beginning 
of a British withdrawal� The sharp devia-
tion from previous military strategy led to 
political instability in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s�
The period of 1972-75 saw similar 
trends in the inf luence of the British gov-
ernment’s considerable state capacity on 
the duration and intensity of the internal 
conflict� First, the British government 
continued to misunderstand aspects of the 
conflict due to its location in a peripher-
al province� Specifically, London did not 
understand Unionist desires, thinking 
them to prize devolution more highly over 
a stable constitutional order that would 
guarantee Northern Ireland’s place in the 
United Kingdom� Moreover, its lack of un-
derstanding of local politics manifested 
itself in Normalization, which devolved 
power to local police forces like the UDR 
and RUC, which were viewed as partisan 
in the conflict� Neumann (2003) argues 
that the British government undermined 
itself in this decision and notes that there 
was “little understanding amongst British 
ministers that, in a deeply divided society, 
the acceptance of law-enforcement was 
bound to be perceived in sectarian terms, 
and that impartiality was determined by 
the local security forces’ communal com-
position as much as by their objective pro-
fessionalism” (p� 182)� Arguably, the shift 
in reliance to local security forces, most of 
whom were Protestant, may have caused 
the conflict to endure longer�
Second, as before, the military poli-
cy of Britain was fraught with internal 
contradictions during this period� Dual 
mandates of “regaining the trust” of the 
Catholic community and fighting the 
paramilitaries led to a scaling down of the 
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Although the British government not-
ed the importance of the shared Irish bor-
der, it began to take the position of Dublin 
more seriously after August 1979, when 
the IRA assassinated Lord Mountbatten 
in the Republic of Ireland and killed 18 
British soldiers in Warrenpoint� This was 
a turning point for the new Thatcher Cab-
inet that underscored the importance of 
cooperation on border security (Thatcher, 
1995)� Shortly thereafter, the Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland, Humphrey 
Atkins, invited members of both govern-
ments to participate in a Constitution-
al Conference in 1980� This conference, 
along with a series of inter-governmental 
meetings between 1976 and 1981, failed 
to achieve any significant change in Brit-
ish strategy, but finally, in 1981, London 
threw its weight behind another constitu-
tional initiative aimed at an internal set-
tlement and devolution (Joyce & Murtagh, 
1983)� But by this point, neither the Irish 
government nor the SDLP were appeased, 
both of which were frightened by the im-
mense degree of Catholic support for the 
ongoing prison hunger strikes and the 
potential growth of Sinn Fein as a viable 
electoral force (Neumann, 2003)�
These hunger strikes of 1980 and 1981 
were prompted by the withdrawal of Spe-
cial Category status� Special Category had 
existed since 1972 and allowed paramili-
tary prisoners to claim they were “political 
prisoners�” Its removal was tantamount to 
claiming there was no difference between 
“convicted terrorists” and “run-of-the-
mill criminals” (Neumann, 2003, p� 110)� 
Thatcher defended the withdrawal of the 
status by confirming, “There is no such 
thing as political murder, political bomb-
ing, or political violence� There is only 
criminal murder, criminal bombing, and 
criminal violence” (“Mrs� Thatcher pledg-
es no sellout,” 1981)� What really was at 
was believed to lie in the long term� In 
the meantime, direct rule would have to 
suffice� Throughout this period, violence 
dropped by nearly 75% from 1976 to 1978, 
and while scattered attacks still occurred, 
this period of the Troubles was consid-
erably less intense that its predecessors 
(Neumann, 2003)�
Because direct rule had been adopted 
on a basically permanent basis, coopera-
tion between London and the Republic 
of Ireland had broken down (Ceallaigh, 
1996)� Desiring the eventual unification 
of the island of Ireland, the Irish gov-
ernment in Dublin wanted the British 
government to recommit to a regime of 
devolution and power-sharing that would 
incorporate cross-border cooperation be-
tween the Republic and Northern Ireland 
(Neumann, 2003)� Thankfully for Dublin, 
its credibility with the Nationalist minori-
ty in Northern Ireland allowed it pres-
sure London by undermining Britain’s 
military and political strategies� Later 
in this period, Westminster expressed it 
was essential that “Irish Prime Minister 
Charles Haughey should not support” the 
hunger strikes of Republican prisoners in 
1980 and 1981 (Emery, 1980)� Moreover, 
the land border between the Republic and 
Northern Ireland gave Dublin bargaining 
power� Callaghan, elected Prime Minister 
of the UK in April 1976, accused Dublin 
of not taking seriously “the vital need for 
close border cooperation if the IRA threat 
was to be contained” (Callaghan, 1987, p� 
499)� Later, after Margaret Thatcher un-
seated the Labour majority in 1979, she 
too echoed the sentiment that “the border 
… is of crucial significance to the secu-
rity problem” (Thatcher, 1995, p� 385)� It 
became clear that the Republic of Ireland 
was a crucial partner in resolving the 
Troubles, one whose preferences would 
have to be accommodated�
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began to advocate strongly for British co-
operation with Dublin� Their pivot, part-
ly caused by electoral pressure caused by 
Sinn Fein, evidenced that direct rule from 
London was untenable for the minority 
and that Britain was no longer viewed as 
an impartial and honest broker (Neumann, 
2003)� SDLP eventually withdrew from 
the by-election for the seat of Fermanagh 
and South Tyrone to show support for 
Bobby Sands, a move London found incon-
ceivable (Taylor, 2014)� More importantly, 
though, Bobby Sands’ victory, as well as 
Sinn Fein’s relative success in the Assem-
bly elections, refuted the idea that “men of 
violence” or supporters of the IRA were 
on the fringes of society, although a clear 
majority of Catholic still supported consti-
tutional Nationalists like the SDLP� This 
clear refutation of British belief in the 
moderate middle contributed to a gradu-
al growth of British distrust of the local 
political process� The Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland, Roy Mason, once set 
up a local economic council, and in so do-
ing, he made it explicit that no politicians 
should be included: “If, in this province, 
you decide to bring politicians on … then 
your economic council, first of all, will be 
very quickly bloated; and secondly, I don’t 
want political squabbles to spill over” 
(“Roy Mason on the economic prospects,” 
1977)� In the absence of more permanent 
solutions, British politicians decided to 
wait it out until “existing leaders [were] 
replaced by abler successors more willing 
to reach a compromise across sectarian 
barriers” (Walker, 1977)� Until then, di-
rect rule would continue�
As all these political developments were 
unfolding, the military’s counterinsurgen-
cy campaign in Northern Ireland remained 
limited� Citing familiar reasons, Mason 
declared, “A democracy functions by the 
will of the people and through the rule of 
stake was Britain’s policy of Normaliza-
tion� The second of the hunger strikes, 
occurring in 1981, saw ten Republican 
prisoners die in the Maze prison, includ-
ing the notable Bobby Sands, who had won 
a by-election to be elected as a Member 
of Parliament at Westminster (English, 
2005)� After his death on hunger strike, his 
election agent, Owen Carron, held his seat 
after an increased vote (English, 2005)� 
International media coverage brought 
attention to the hunger strike and the Re-
publican movement, causing the popular-
ity of the hunger strikers to surge in the 
Catholic community (White, 1993)� Lon-
don could not understand the support for 
the hunger strikers, given that Criminal-
ization led them to believe that those in 
the jails were criminals on the fringes of 
society (Neumann, 2003)� The British gov-
ernment failed to grasp that even anti-Re-
publican Catholics, like Mairead Corrigan, 
noted peace-maker, saw them “as men from 
our community� We know how they have 
come to be there� And above all we don’t 
want them suffering within the prisons” 
(quoted in O’Malley, 1997)� As a result, 
what had previously been a fringe element 
of Northern Irish politics then emerged as 
a potent electoral force: Sinn Fein, wide-
ly regarded the political wing of the IRA 
(Taylor, 2014)� In 1982, another Northern 
Ireland Assembly was established at Stor-
mont, but its attempt to “win back support 
for moderates” backfired when the SDLP 
decided not to take its seats, allowing 
Sinn Fein to gain five seats, even narrowly 
missing two more seats in Belfast North 
and Fermanagh (Neumann, 2003)� 
This dawn of Sinn Fein as a credible 
electoral force meant that constitutional 
Nationalists like the SDLP experienced 
difficulties in staying moderate (Taylor, 
2014)� As time went on, even the SDLP 
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disadvantageous outcomes in the Assem-
bly in 1982, forced Westminster to return 
to the drawing board once again�
As before, British policy during 1976-
82 ref lected the governments’ lack of un-
derstanding of the forces at its periphery� 
The British government could not grasp 
that even those who desired peace still 
saw hunger strikers as men from their 
communities, and its resoluteness on the 
revocation of Special Category status led 
to international and domestic sympathy 
for the hunger strikers� This in turn led 
to the rise of Sinn Fein, which pulled con-
stitutional Nationalists in their direction 
as they battled for electoral power� Strong 
states, like the UK in the case of Northern 
Ireland, may underestimate actors or mis-
calculate decisions made in regions they 
do not view as vital, which may contribute 
to conflict duration� In addition, strong 
states might downplay military solutions 
in favor of political solutions� By this time, 
the British government settled into a fair-
ly stable pattern of limited counterinsur-
gency, believing that tough security mea-
sures would drive IRA recruitment� The 
military gradually became viewed as a 
tool by which a political settlement could 
be reached� As Neumann (2003) notes, 
“[The norm of minimum force] reinforced 
London’s conviction that there could be 
no ‘military solution,’ and that it was the 
security forces’ task to buy time for a po-
litical settlement in achieving an accept-
able level of violence … in that sense, it 
was the British government rather than 
the IRA, which had first embarked on a 
‘long war’” (p� 181)� While this long war 
dragged on, London sought an accommo-
dation with Dublin and downplayed local 
politics� During these years, deaths were 
among the lowest of all of the years of the 
conflict, indicating that a state’s reliance 
on solutions beyond military force may 
law� It cannot behave like a totalitarian 
state, nor is it right that it should” (Han-
sard, 1977a)� Similarly, the British govern-
ment still perceived that “tough” security 
measures would drive IRA recruitment by 
alienating moderate Catholics (Hansard, 
1977b)� The British Army’s activity also 
did not escalate due to the assumptions of 
Normalization, the overarching policy at 
the time – namely that the gradual return 
to local law enforcement would make the 
situation more stable (Neumann, 2003)� 
However, Normalization failed to achieve 
its promise of completely stabilizing the 
situation for a few reasons� First, the RUC, 
the local authority to which the British 
Army was gradually ceding its respon-
sibilities, was still essentially exclusively 
Protestant, which caused law enforcement 
to be regarded as a tool in the Catho-
lic-Protestant power struggle (Brown & 
MacGinty, 2003)� Moreover, government 
rhetoric about adherence to “law and or-
der” failed to convince observers, given 
the Army’s heavy reliance on uncorrobo-
rated evidence, extended holding powers, 
and non-jury courts (Neumann, 2003)� 
While they may have been strictly speak-
ing “successful,” many of the operations 
that were carried out by the Army did not 
align with the British ideal of civilian po-
licing (Weitzer, 1995)�
Neumann (2003) argues that British 
policy during these years of 1976-82 made 
assumptions of “an almost ideal game sit-
uation, that is, one in which London was 
the only actor to determine the strategic 
environment” (p� 121)� In reality, countless 
players and factors – including the gov-
ernment of the Republic of Ireland, a glob-
al recession, hunger strikers, Sinn Fein, 
and the IRA’s indefatigable disruption 
– all frustrated London’s attempts to im-
plement strategy� The consequences of the 
second hunger strike in 1981, along with 
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identities of fellow paramilitary members 
(informants who became known as “super-
grass”)� The supergrass system was cred-
ited by 1983 as having ‘broken up the Ul-
ster Volunteer Force command structure 
in Belfast and virtually eliminated the 
IRA in Northern Belfast” (Moloney, 1983)� 
Second, on a few occasions, the security 
forces drastically exceeded the appropri-
ate level of force; one particularly notable 
incident occurred in which six unarmed 
Catholic men were shot dead by a RUC 
undercover unit (Neumann, 2003)� While 
no one in London wanted to make what 
became known as “shoot to kill” as official 
government policy, members of the gov-
ernment harbored a certain sympathy for 
the security forces, who had been thrust 
in a situation where “they were expected 
to play by rules which the IRA would have 
never dreamt about” (Neumann, 2003, p� 
131)� Despite the government’s sympathy 
for the difficulty of the Army’s position, 
though, shoot-to-kill did not make its way 
into official military policy�
In the absence of consequential shifts 
in British counterterrorism policy, Irish 
cross-border cooperation emerged as 
the primary security concern at the time 
(Thatcher, 1995)� Several notable attacks 
occurred to spur this shift, such as the Har-
rods bombing in December 1983, where 
an IRA car bomb outside a department 
store in London killed six people, and the 
Brighton hotel bombing in October 1984, 
where five people died in a bomb attack 
on the site of Conservative Party confer-
ence (Buchan, 2011)� These events under-
scored the fact the Northern Ireland con-
f lict would spiral into the mainland, if left 
unchecked� Accordingly, London sought 
to make the Irish government a responsi-
ble stakeholder in the management of the 
situation in Northern Ireland� On the Irish 
side, Garret FitzGerald, then the Taoise-
contribute to lower deaths, which may be 
in some way connected to state capacity�
1982 – 1988
The most significant event of the 1982-
88 period was the signing of the An-
glo-Irish Agreement in 1985� Constraints 
and pressures had arisen from the direct 
rule experiment of 1976-82, and London 
came to believe Westminster governing 
the province would contribute little to the 
containment of the conflict, nor was there 
any realistic prospect of power-sharing at 
the time� Therefore, the only way to pre-
vent the conflict from spiraling into the 
mainland was to seek an accommodation 
with Dublin, making direct rule logisti-
cally easier for the British government� 
Seeking to reduce the violence while ne-
gotiations between the Irish and British 
governments were underway, the British 
Army’s main goal was to gain efficiency at 
containing paramilitary activity, particu-
larly through improvements in cross-bor-
der security cooperation� Despite her 
reputation as “Iron Lady,” in Northern 
Ireland, the Thatcher period was not as-
sociated with an increased use of military 
force, given that the existing political 
and constitutional objectives limited the 
military objectives that could be pursued 
(Thatcher, 1995)� Indeed, the Home Secre-
tary of Thatcher’s Cabinet, Douglas Hurd, 
deemed the three most popular options for 
escalating the use of force – internment, 
shoot-to-kill, and cross-border hot pursuit 
– as counterproductive and inadvisable 
(Neumann, 2003)� 
With that said, two new experiments 
in military strategy did emerge in these 
years: the systematic use of accomplice ev-
idence, and shoot-to-kill (Hansard, 1984)� 
First, the British Army began to rely heav-
ily on intelligence from arrested members 
of the paramilitaries who divulged the 
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agreement� The mid-1986 collapse of the 
recently-reinstated Northern Ireland As-
sembly exemplified the British govern-
ment’s abandonment of devolution at this 
time� This new focus on the Irish dimen-
sion culminated in the signing of the An-
glo-Irish Agreement (AIA) by Thatcher 
and FitzGerald on November 15, 1985 
(Kenny & Kenny, 1986)�
The AIA established the Anglo-Irish 
Intergovernmental Conference, which 
would be made up of officials from the 
British and Irish governments� The body 
sought to promote “cross-border cooper-
ation” and had a consultative role only – 
that is, it had no power to make decisions 
or change laws (Cochrane, 1997)� The UK 
also agreed that all British Army patrols 
in Northern Ireland would have a civilian 
RUC escort (Cox, 1987)� Finally, the treaty 
confirmed that there would be no change 
in the constitutional position of North-
ern Ireland unless a majority of its people 
consented to a united Ireland (O’Leary, 
1987)� For the Irish government, the AIA 
ach (Ireland’s prime minister equivalent), 
believed that the only way to resolve the 
conflict was “to act urgently and resolute-
ly together on the political front” to find 
a new constitutional solution (Havilland, 
1983)� 
However, the British government did 
not want the Irish government to have any 
real authority� As Christopher Mallaby, 
the coordinator of Anglo-Irish relations in 
the Cabinet, explained to Neumann (2003), 
“Any situation where the British govern-
ment would require the Irish govern-
ment’s agreement to any action or policy 
would [have been] unacceptable” (p� 125)� 
Gradually, British constitutional strategy 
during this time shifted to a negotiation of 
a balanced inter-governmental framework 
that granted Dublin a “legitimate inter-
est” but “no real powers” in the affairs of 
Northern Ireland (Neumann, 2003)� Brit-
ish political strategy in Northern Ireland 
accordingly shifted during 1982-88, favor-
ing to sideline the local political parties 
while focusing on an inter-governmental 
The 1985 signature of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (BBC News, 2014)�
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through similar tactics� To this end, Britain 
began to understand the desires and fears 
of the players in its peripheral province, 
and the Anglo-Irish Agreement, while un-
popular domestically, did cause local polit-
ical parties to revisit their intransigence� 
As before, the British government chose to 
downplay the military element in favor of 
political strategies – the major goal of the 
military during this period was to contain 
paramilitary activity and become more ef-
ficient at this task� The British Army saw 
a slight hiccup in its gradual calibration 
of ‘appropriate use of force’ when several 
shoot-to-kill incidents occurred, but over-
all, in this case, a strong state chose to 
sideline military solutions for political or 
economic solutions� Namely, the British fo-
cus on obtaining an accommodation from 
Dublin and its use of intelligence through 
the supergrass structure both represented 
the state’s attempts to fight the war using 
less violent techniques� Arguably, strate-
gies like these may have taken longer to 
work, lengthening the conflict’s duration, 
but they most likely resulted in the deaths 
of fewer people, lowering its intensity� As 
in previous years, the period of 1982-88 
illustrated several major themes in how 
strong states choose to respond to civil 
wars�
1989 – 1998
The successful conclusion of the Belfast 
Agreement in 1998 represents the great-
est achievement of British policy in North-
ern Ireland and the end of the Troubles 
in Northern Ireland� In marked contrast 
to the AIA, British policy shifted towards 
the promotion of an agreed settlement, 
and because there was no point imposing 
changes to the constitutional position of 
Northern Ireland (because either party 
would find it unacceptable), Britain was 
prepared to accept any outcome as long 
supported and strengthened Constitution-
al Nationalism in the wake of fears of a 
nascent and radical Sinn Fein; it also per-
ceived the AIA as indirectly providing an 
incentive for Unionists to agree to pow-
er-sharing (Neumann, 2003; FTN 68)� 
The improved cooperation between the 
British and Irish government would lat-
er become key in the passage of the Good 
Friday Agreement thirteen years later 
(Ruane & Todd, 2003)� 
However, the AIA failed to improve 
cross-border security cooperation; the mi-
nority also became no more inclined to 
support the Northern Irish institutions, 
and Dublin’s public criticism of Britain 
intensified (Neumann, 2003)� In addi-
tion, the accord was strongly rejected 
by Unionists (Cox, 1987)� In response to 
strong Unionist opposition, Thatcher re-
sponded that “the people of Northern Ire-
land can get rid of the inter-governmental 
conference by agreeing to devolved gov-
ernment” (O’Leary & McGarry, 1996, p� 
234)� Despite this opposition, the AIA is 
credited with several political results: it 
did cause the Unionists to re-engage po-
litically, and the AIA also contributed 
to the marginalization of Republicans, 
leading to a perception in the Republican 
camp of political and military stalemate� 
This forced the leadership to review the 
assumptions on which its strategies were 
based, and the 1988 broadcasting ban of 
twelve organizations, including Sinn Fein, 
also contributed a Republican sense of 
marginalization (“Whose oxygen,” 1988)� 
All of these changes contributed to the 
parties’ increased willingness to come to 
the bargaining table in the 1990s, when 
the Troubles drew to a shaky close�
This penultimate period from 1982-88 
saw a refinement of British strategy, as 
evidenced by the conflict’s later resolution 
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tioned political objectives� London’s goal 
of a devolved government on the basis of 
an agreed settlement necessitated a cease-
fire from the IRA, which would allow Re-
publicans to participate in the settlement 
(Hollywood, 1997)� 
Although paramilitary activity on the 
British mainland intensified in 1994 and 
1995, the British government seemed con-
vinced this rise in paramilitary activity 
represented the beginnings of a peace set-
tlement: as John Major (2013), the Prime 
Minister of the UK at the time, described, 
“[A]n offer of peace needed to be accom-
panied by violence, to show their volun-
teers that they were not surrendering” (p� 
433)� In order to trigger a permanent IRA 
ceasefire that would enable Sinn Fein to 
participate in political talks, the leaders of 
the SDLP and Sinn Fein produced several 
drafts of a declaration of principles which 
would be announced by the British and 
Irish prime ministers� The final draft of 
their document referred to the collective 
right of the “Irish people” to self-determi-
nation and overturned the idea of consent 
by stating consent had to be achieved “over 
a period” wherein the two governments 
would legislate for Irish unity, regardless 
of opinion in Northern Ireland (Mallie 
& McKittrick, 1997)� Had they been an-
nounced, these principles obviously would 
have triggered an end to the IRA’s military 
campaign, since it negated the principle of 
consent, abdicated the need for agreement 
from both sides, and rejected Westminster 
as a neutral arbiter (Major, 2013)� Natu-
rally, the British government thought that 
this document would have torched the po-
litical process, as the majority would have 
viewed it as selling out Northern Ireland’s 
place in the United Kingdom (Neumann, 
2003)�
After several months of bilateral nego-
as it had achieved sufficient agreement be-
tween the local parties� London began to 
refer to itself simply as “partisan for prog-
ress” (Neumann, 2003, p� 149)� 
At the beginning of this period, having 
achieved cooperation with the Republic 
of Ireland through the AIA, the British 
government returned to its traditional ob-
jective of facilitating agreement on devo-
lution and a limited Irish dimension� To 
achieve this, it launched negotiations for 
a settlement amongst the various parties, 
focusing on the principle of consent and 
the integrity of the political process� How-
ever, a major question emerged of whether 
or not to include Sinn Fein in this polit-
ical process� Earlier on, London’s aim of 
political stability meant that there was no 
point in including Sinn Fein if it destroyed 
the likelihood of securing a settlement 
(Major, 2013)� However, if the IRA ended 
its campaign of violence, talks with Sinn 
Fein might become possible and make the 
peace more stable (McKittrick & Brown, 
1989)� London also knew that there was a 
perceived political and military stalemate 
in the Republican community at this time 
and took steps to maintain this perception� 
The military strategy shifted at this 
time as well� The British Army remained 
involved only to the extent that it served 
as a tool to support the political process 
and maintain the Republican perception of 
military stalemate (Neumann, 2003)� The 
then-Secretary of State for Northern Ire-
land, Peter Brooke, made it clear that the 
military presence was “made necessary by 
violence, [would] be maintained as long as 
there [was] violence, but [would] certain-
ly be reduced when violence [came] to an 
end” (Hennessy, 2000, p� 68)� In addition, 
the formulation of Westminster’s mili-
tary strategy was guided, as it often was 
throughout the conflict, by its aforemen-
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down, the responsibilities of these institu-
tions would be transferred to a standing 
Inter-Government Conference (O’Leary, 
1997)� This Joint Framework was clear-
ly overbalanced towards the Nationalist 
position, since the Irish side had made no 
new concessions to justify the Joint Dec-
laration’s favoritism towards it� In fact, its 
default mechanism was an invitation for 
Nationalists to make the Northern Ireland 
assembly unworkable, thus torching the 
need for any Unionist cooperation (Neu-
mann, 2003)� 
Accordingly, the peace talks back-
tracked in February 1996, when two civil-
ians were killed in the London Docklands 
bombing, which represented the end of the 
seventeen-month IRA ceasefire (Joyce, 
2016)� IRA violence continued for the next 
two years, but despite widespread calls for 
an all-out security offensive, London re-
sisted the urge to reintroduce internment 
(Hibbs, Harnden, & Savill, 1996)� Prior to 
this, the reliance on locally recruited se-
curity forces had been met with intense 
criticism after it was revealed that mem-
bers of the UDR had passed on sensitive 
files to Loyalist paramilitaries (Hansard, 
1990)� In the end, fifty-nine UDR officers 
were charged, and this event damaged 
what little remaining impartiality the se-
curity forces were perceived to have� Just 
as Britain was beginning to mediate an 
agreed settlement, it was extremely im-
portant that the military situation not es-
calate (Neumann, 2003)� The peace talks 
continued at Stormont in June 1996 with-
out Sinn Fein� But in May 1997, a gener-
al election was held across the UK, and 
Sinn Fein increased its share of the vote 
to 16%, making it the third largest par-
ty in the region, and winning two seats 
in Parliament (Taylor, 2014)� Shortly after 
the election, the new British Prime Minis-
ter, Tony Blair, endorsed the Framework 
tiations, the Joint Declaration for Peace 
(also known as the Downing Street Decla-
ration, or DSD) was announced on Decem-
ber 15th, 1993, by the British Prime Min-
ister Major and the Irish Prime Minister, 
Albert Reynolds� It nominally resembled 
the draft written by the SDLP and Sinn 
Fein leaders, but its content was funda-
mentally different from the proposals of 
the original draft (Mallie & McKittrick, 
1997)� In fact, many thought it to represent 
the exact opposite: the DSD restored the 
constitutional status quo by stating that 
self-determination had to be exercised on 
the basis of consent and gave no timeline 
for a united Ireland (Cox, 1996)� Neumann 
(2003) refers to the DSD as a “tactical 
masterstroke” that united the whole spec-
trum of constitutional Nationalism, along 
with the biggest Unionist party, behind its 
agenda of devolved government and the 
principle of consent (p� 152)� 
Shortly thereafter, on August 31st, 
1994, the IRA issued a statement announc-
ing the complete cessation of military ac-
tivities� Throughout this ceasefire, the 
IRA machine was far from inactive; to the 
contrary, targeting, training, and acquisi-
tion continued as normal during this time 
(Sharrock, 1995)� The Combined Loyalist 
Military Command followed suit not soon 
after, on October 13th, 1994, when they is-
sued a statement announcing a ceasefire on 
behalf of all loyalist paramilitaries (McAu-
ley, 2005)� The temporary cessation of 
hostilities allowed a Sinn Fein delegation 
to meet with officials from the Northern 
Ireland Office in January 1995� A month 
later, the British and Irish governments 
released the Joint Framework document 
(O’Leary, 1995)� The Joint Framework 
document proposed North-South institu-
tions that would be established by an Act 
of Parliament; in the event that a future 
Northern Ireland assembly would break 
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ty community (Cox, Guelke, & Stephen, 
2006)� Finally, the three “strands” referred 
to three sets of institutions: (1) the demo-
cratic institutions of Northern Ireland, de-
scribed above, (2) the “north-south” insti-
tutions created between Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland, and (3) the 
“east-west” institutions created between 
Ireland and Great Britain� O’Leary (1998) 
describes these institutions as making 
“Northern Ireland bi-national” and estab-
lished “elements of co-sovereignty�” While 
many commentators have compared the 
Agreement to the Sunningdale Agreement 
of 1973 (leading one Member of Parlia-
ment even to refer to it as “Sunningdale 
for slow learners”), scholars note major 
issues omitted by Sunningdale that were 
addressed by the Good Friday Agreement, 
including the principle of self-determina-
tion and the recognition of both national 
identities (Rasnic, 2003)� 
The Good Friday Agreement was set to 
be approved by voters across the Ireland 
in May 1998� In response, the Loyalist 
Volunteer Force declared a ceasefire in the 
hopes it would encourage voters to reject 
the Good Friday Agreement� But on May 
22nd, the referendums were held on the 
Belfast Agreement, one in the Republic of 
Ireland and the other in Northern Ireland� 
They succeeded with 94% and 71% in fa-
vor respectively (Cox, Guelke, & Stephen, 
2006)� Neumann (2003) argues that the 
integration of Sinn Fein into the political 
process extracted a high price, since Lon-
don failed to extract a definitive commit-
ment to decommission arms� Due to spot-
ty disarmament, violence continues to this 
day on a small-scale basis� Despite this 
continuing unrest, many consider 1998 to 
be the end of the Troubles (Aughey, 2005)�
Analysis
The final years of the Troubles, along 
Documents and the criteria for inclusion 
in all-party talks and signaled his com-
mitment to meet with Sinn Fein to clar-
ify certain issues (Pruitt, 2007)� On June 
25th, 1997, the British and Irish govern-
ments gave the IRA five weeks to call an 
unequivocal ceasefire, and the heat on the 
IRA intensified on July 18th, when John 
Hume of the SDLP and Gerry Adams of 
Sinn Fein called on the IRA to renew its 
ceasefire (Pruit, 2007)� The IRA finally 
acquiesced on July 19th, announcing the 
renewal of its 1994 ceasefire�
With the IRA agreeing to end its vio-
lence, this paved the way for Sinn Fein to 
sign the Mitchell Principles in September 
1997, which was a list of six ground rules 
agreed to by the parties in Northern Ire-
land regarding participation in the talks� 
After Sinn Fein’s signature of the Prin-
ciples, multi-party talks resumed (McK-
ittrick, 1996)� Throughout this final phase 
of negotiations, the British government 
maintained it was not committed to any 
particular outcome and would support any 
conclusions resulting from the discussions, 
provided sufficient consensus emerged 
(Neumann, 2003)� Finally, on April 10th, 
1998, the Belfast Agreement (commonly 
known as the Good Friday Agreement) 
was signed at Stormont�
The Good Friday Agreement consisted 
of several components, including devolu-
tion, power-sharing, designation, and the 
Three Strands� Under the Agreement, 
Northern Ireland would have a devolved 
government, where the UK parliament 
would transfer legislative powers to the 
new Northern Ireland Assembly� This 
body would in turn devolve executive 
powers to the Northern Ireland Executive, 
which would consist of both unionists and 
nationalists, and special voting arrange-
ments gave veto rights to the minori-
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Second, stronger states may equivocate 
on the use of military force and choose 
to rely on political or economic strate-
gies instead� In continuation with policy 
that began in the 1980s, the military was 
downplayed during this final period, and 
the British Army remained involved in the 
province only to the extent it supported 
the political process and maintained the 
Republicans’ belief in a military stalemate� 
Instead, in the 1990s, the British govern-
ment devoted its energies to facilitating 
agreement on devolution and power-shar-
ing, and the Downing Street Declaration, 
the Joint Framework, and the Mitchell 
Principles all exemplify political strat-
egies that contributed to the resolution 
of the war through the acceptance of the 
Good Friday Agreement� Strong states, 
like the UK, may understand that the use 
of overwhelming force could inf lame the 
population against them� Weak states may 
understand this too, but the key difference 
between weak and strong states in this re-
gard is that strong states have alternatives� 
Strong states may try to use political, con-
stitutional, or economic tools before re-
verting to the use of military force, and 
these policies may sometimes conflict or 
contradict each other (e�g� 1970s military 
strategy as it came to simultaneously win-
ning over the Catholic community while 
putting down the IRA)� One possible rea-
son strong states experience longer civil 
wars is that it takes them a longer time 
to settle on a strategy, given the many 
tools and options from which they may 
choose� In the case of Northern Ireland, 
it took at least fifteen years for the British 
government to settle on the combination 
of military and political pressures it used 
to eventually seek a settlement� This hes-
itance to use military force from strong 
states might also explain my earlier sta-
tistical findings of a negative correlation 
with the entire course of the conflict, il-
lustrate two key themes regarding the in-
f luence of state capacity on conflict dura-
tion and intensity: (1) the underestimation 
of states of conflicts occurring at their 
peripheries, and (2) the subordination of 
military strategies to political or econom-
ic strategies� 
First, the case of the Troubles illustrates 
that states – strong and weak alike – may 
misunderstand or underestimate conflicts 
which occur in peripheral regions� For the 
first decade of the civil unrest, the British 
government underestimated the severity 
of grievances held by participants in the 
violence and misinterpreted their political 
objectives� As Neumann (2003) contends, 
“London’s initial reactions to the street 
marches, protests, and civil disturbanc-
es in the second half of the 1960s was a 
mixture of disbelief, uncertainty, and re-
luctance … the reforms the Westminster 
government pressed for after the violent 
clashes of October 1968 were too modest 
to have the effect of securing peace” (p� 16)� 
The case of Zaire also illustrated this ten-
dency of states to underestimate conflicts 
in their peripheries, as its rebellion began 
in the eastern provinces, as far from Kin-
shasa as possible� However, the case of the 
First Congo War indicates that it is much 
more dangerous for weak states to neglect 
the periphery, as they are more susceptible 
to toppling quickly when faced with rebel-
lion in far-f lung regions of their country� 
Strong states, like the United Kingdom, 
might be able to afford to neglect or mis-
understand peripheral provinces, since 
their intrinsic strength buys them time 
to “figure it out�” In this regard, state ca-
pacity may be associated with increased 
duration of civil wars because the endog-
enous strength of these states insulates 
them from conflict for longer than in weak 
states�
53
statistical relationship between low battle 
deaths and state capacity� However, if this 
is not the case, this opens up a potential 
avenue for future research� On that note, 
this thesis now concludes with a discus-
sion of the implications of its findings for 
policymakers and researchers�
Conclusion & Implications
This thesis has shown that state ca-pacity is a statistically significant predictor of the duration and in-
tensity of civil wars, finding that both mil-
itary capacity and fiscal capacity are as-
sociated with longer but less intense civil 
wars� States possessing these capabilities 
may face wars in peripheral regions, like 
Northern Ireland, in which they underes-
timate the severity of the threat faced and 
experience difficulty projecting power in 
the unfamiliar region� These strong states 
also possess resources that allow them to 
pick their battles, protect their own troops 
and civilians, target rebels more effective-
ly, and forestall the rebels’ recruitment 
efforts through the reliance on political 
solutions and through the provision of aid 
and government services� Despite these 
apparent strengths, the set of cases exam-
ined in this thesis still deals with states 
weak enough to allow a civil war to break 
out in the first place and with rebels above 
the threshold of rebel group viability� The 
case of Northern Ireland also indicates 
that strong states’ use of non-military 
solutions to civil wars may increase their 
duration� As a result, these strong states 
experience protracted conflicts with fewer 
battle deaths per year� 
On the other hand, weak states either 
must resort to tremendous violence in the 
absence of non-military strategies, or, as 
in the case of Zaire, they have no credible 
military or security presence in the first 
between military expenditures and battle 
deaths� Although initially surprising, this 
relationship may make more sense in the 
context of strong states possessing the 
restraint to make sure those military ex-
penditures are used in a way that does not 
contribute to rebel recruitment�
Overall, the Troubles of Northern Ire-
land provide a case in which a strong state 
– one of the strongest in the world – ex-
perienced a long but less intense inter-
nal conflict�  In this instance, the central 
government underestimated the severity 
of grievances held in one of its peripher-
al regions, and its lack of familiarity with 
the local political situation caused initial 
errors and miscalculations of policies� In 
addition, the state took time to strike a 
balance between military and political in-
struments of power, eventually favoring 
the latter, which may have contributed to 
a lower level of intensity but a longer dura-
tion� It is worth noting that this intrastate 
conflict had a favorable outcome for the 
government� In the case where a state is 
strong and it still eventually loses its civil 
war, the mechanisms contributing to my 
statistical findings of long duration and 
low intensity may be dramatically differ-
ent – perhaps, in these circumstances, the 
resources allow governments to hang on 
longer, or the state vascillates and errs on 
the side of too little or too much military 
force� Moreover, it is possible to conceive 
of a strong state – perhaps an authoritari-
an regime like the current one fighting the 
Syrian civil war – that does not favor the 
British government’s strategy of restraint 
and instead uses its military superiority as 
its primary strategy� How would we ex-
plain the finding of low intensity and long 
duration in this instance? At first blush, it 
is possible that these circumstances simply 
do not occur as often as situations of Brit-
ish restraint do, which may explain the 
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state strength and conflict duration, this 
thesis enters this important variable of 
state capacity into the scholarly conversa-
tion of the predictors of conflict duration� 
Similarly, the body of literature regarding 
conflict intensity has focused on largely 
immutable qualities of the nation-state, 
such as oil exportation, rough terrain, 
ethnic fractionalization, and democrati-
zation, with little attention paid to state 
capacity as a potential factor� This thesis 
makes a valuable contribution in its argu-
ment that the endogenous strength of one 
of the most important actors in any civil 
war – the state itself – must be considered 
in discussions of conflict intensity�
However, this study is limited in a few 
dimensions that open up opportunities for 
future research� In the quantitative anal-
yses, chief ly, there are concerns of poten-
tial reverse causality in the connection 
between military spending and conflict 
intensity; it could be the case that states 
that have low military expenditures spend 
less on their military due to the low inten-
sity of the conflict, which would weaken 
the assertion that military expenditures 
decreases civil war intensity� While lag-
ging the military expenditures variable 
does partially solve this problem, it is 
worth noting as a possible limitation of 
this research� In addition, this study could 
be improved by larger amounts of data on 
military, fiscal, and bureaucratic capacity, 
as the World Development Indicators have 
about 360 missing observations, while the 
ICRG data only begins in the year 1984� 
On the qualitative side, examination of ad-
ditional case studies would aid scholars’ 
understanding of the mechanisms linking 
state capacity to conflict duration and in-
tensity� Given their unique and qualitative 
nature, claiming generalizability from the 
cases of Zaire and Northern Ireland is dif-
ficult� In particular, as brief ly discussed 
place� Both of these governmental situa-
tions contribute to a shorter duration of 
civil wars� Weak states are also unable 
to protect civilians and control their own 
forces, as evidenced by the mass looting 
and desertion of Zairian forces, which may 
be associated with higher-intensity con-
f licts� These weak states allow conflicts 
in the periphery to blossom into threats 
in urban areas as well, as shown by the 
AFDL’s quick capture of major cities like 
Lubumbashi and Kisangani in the early 
months of the First Congo War� Overall, 
weak states are less able to achieve their 
objectives of maintaining the stability of 
their regime and country, leading to short 
but bloody conflicts�
This thesis contributes significantly to 
the scholarship of civil wars and expands 
upon existing discussions described in its 
literature review� The proposed definition 
of state capacity addresses criticisms that 
state capacity is difficult to operational-
ize while providing a workable framework 
within which scholars can continue to ad-
dress the inf luence of state strength on 
variables of interest� While the literature 
regarding the impact of state capacity on 
conflict onset is well-developed, this the-
sis has made an important contribution by 
analyzing how state strength might mat-
ter in cases where the state is weak enough 
to allow a violent challenge to its authori-
ty� State strength, it appears, matters even 
after civil wars break out� In addition, this 
thesis expands upon existing discussions 
within the literature regarding conflict 
duration and intensity� The former body 
of scholarship has not fully examined the 
relationship between state capacity and 
length of civil war, and when it has an-
alyzed the correlation, it often relies on 
imperfect proxies of state capacity like 
democratization� Through its quantitative 
examination of the relationship between 
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seem to possess the bureaucratic capa-
bility of committing to negotiated settle-
ments and of maintaining the provision of 
government services, even in the depths of 
civil wars, meaning that peacekeepers may 
wish to strengthen state bureaucracies as 
a means of decreasing civil war intensi-
ty� Another question for further inquiry 
would be examine the iterative aspects 
of government capacity – how do rebel 
groups react to increases in government 
capacity, and how much does rebel group 
capacity matter for conflict duration and 
intensity? Setting these questions aside 
for the future, this thesis is nevertheless 
a first step towards understanding how 
strong states seek to maintain control of 
their populations, how state capacity can 
lessen the intensity of conflicts, and how 
states can mitigate conditions of anarchy 
when civil war breaks out within their 
borders, becoming Leviathans once again� 
in the conclusion of the Northern Ire-
land case study, an examination of case in 
which strong state does choose to employ 
overwhelming military force would con-
tribute greatly to the findings of this the-
sis� Nevertheless, the two case studies pre-
sented in this thesis provide a real-world 
illustration of a few of the potential ways 
in which state capacity may inf luence con-
f lict duration and intensity�
Despite their potential limitations, the 
findings presented in this thesis have im-
portant implications for peacekeepers and 
policymakers� Stronger states tend to ex-
perience lower intensity conflicts that lin-
ger for decades� This could raise a norma-
tive question for peacekeepers on whether 
they encourage more military spending – 
on the one hand, conflicts may become less 
bloody, but on the other hand, they may 
endure longer� Moreover, stronger states 
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